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ABSTRACT
This thesis analyzes causes of construction claims based on 34 litigated cases
in the U.S. construction industry. One such case, Anderson v. Golden is
analyzed in detail, and provides several good lessons about construction
disputes. Secondly, causes and Court decisions of the typical disputes in
construction projects are analyzed. Finally, on the basis of these above
analyses, the following four recommendations are made in order to reduce
construction disputes.
1. About Court decisions
Courts should judge disputes based on what construction services the Owner
received, rather than what the contract says, since the contract is often biased
in favor of one of the parties. If Courts do not do so, each party tries to take
advantage of uncertainties of construction circumstances.
2. About the way of choosing a Contractor
Owners should take into consideration the Contractors' past record in terms
of construction claims in order to avoid Contractors who repeatedly make
clearly unreasonable claims.
3. About who has to take what kinds of risks
Owners should take all risks of unforeseen circumstances and acts of God
since only Owners can control the location and timing of construction.
4. About defective contract documents
If a defect in the contract documents prepared for the Owner by the
Architect/Engineer is found, the correction should be made as quickly as
possible and confirmed in writing. Otherwise, defects provide a good excuse
for the other party and waste time and money.
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1. Introduction
There are many construction claims in the U.S.A. which are very
expensive and time consuming for both sides. I think that this is one of the
main factors which makes the productivity of the U.S. construction industry
relatively low. Everyone who enters into a construction contract wants to
avoid claims. Many people have tried to reduce the number of claims
through revisions to contract forms or references to arbitration. However,
such efforts seem to be ineffective, because the number of claims does not
seem to be decreasing.
I studied 34 of the many cases relating to construction that were decided
by the federal courts in the United States to find the causes of these claims, to
find why efforts to avoid claims were in vain, and to find a way to decrease
claims. In this thesis, I would like to describe my views of how conflicts
between parties develop and how they are settled, citing some of the cases and
making several suggestions to eliminate these causes.
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2. Case study: Anderson v. Golden
The case of M.C. Anderson v. Donald Golden1 is an example of the
kinds of claims that develop, and provides several good lessons. The actual
court decision is presented in Appendix 2.
"This case involves a classic confrontation between the developer
[Golden] of a project, McAlpin Square Shopping Center, and his Contractor
[Anderson], the rough-grading and storm drainage system Contractor. The
conflict which arose during the course of the work was exacerbated by the
weather and other adverse conditions at the site of the development. Each
party accused the other of various breaches of the contract. Anderson filed a
materialmen's lien against the McAlpin Square property. Anderson sued
Donald Golden, the developer of McAlpin Square, seeking monies allegedly
due under the contract, or alternatively, in quantum meruit, reimbursement
of certain funds expended during the course of the job, and attorney's fees.
Golden, in turn, asserted a counterclaim for delay damages, for the cost of
correcting or completing work under Anderson's contract, for expenses
incurred, and for interfering with Golden's title to the property." Please see
Appendix 2 for the actual court decision, which contains a full statement of
facts.
The following issues were presented:
(1) Should Anderson be allowed additional time or not?
(2) Should the Contractor have complied with the three-day notice
requirement for weather-related delays or not?
1569 F. Supp. 122 (1982).
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(3) Should the Owner have named a project representative with full
authority to act for the Owner or not?
(4) Where the locations of easements had been inadvertently omitted
from the original drawings, would inset drawings on other plans, which
showed the easements, have given Anderson ample notice of the existence of
easements or not?
(5) Should the contract be construed to make the provision of "offsite
fill" by Anderson extra work or not?
(6) Should Anderson be allowed additional compensation for
unforseen difficulties in excavation or not?
(7) Where the contract contains no changed-condition clause, but does
contain clauses disclaiming responsibility for accuracy of data and requiring
the Contractor to verify design specifications by inspecting the site, should
there still be an implied warranty by the Owner that conditions are as
described in plans and specifications or not?
(8) Did the Owner misrepresent material facts as to site conditions
where actual ground elevations at the site were different from those shown
on drawings made by architect?
(9) Where time was "of the essence" under the contract, should the
Contractor be entitled to recover extra costs for his labor and services even
though the work was not finished on time?
2.1 Problems originating with contract
2.1.1 Ambiguous contract documents
In the Anderson case, the work was delayed due to various disputed
reasons. One reason was the high moisture content of the soil which made it
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necessary for Anderson to dry it through stockpiling and aeration, the cost of
which was further increased due to unusually frequent rains.
The Contractor, Anderson, assumed in his scheduling that the
condition of the soil was basically "ideal" in spite of more unfavorable reports
in the documents, his own observation that the site was wet, and his general
awareness of the likely weather conditions during the winter months. He
tried to justify the delay in completing the work by relying on an ambiguous
clause which stated the work was to be done as "as rapidly as field conditions
permitted". The Contractor claimed that this contract clause [that "Contractor
agreed to complete work as rapidly as field conditions permitted"] amended
the timetable for the work and allowed additional time to Anderson in the
event of adverse conditions. Anderson submitted requests for extensions of
time.
On the other hand, the Owner, Golden, disagreed with Anderson's
interpretation of the contract and asserted that the Contractor was not only
late, but did not comply with the contract's three-day notice provision, which
states:
8.2.2. Three-day notice of delay from act, neglect or default of
architect, Owner, contractors, fire, stopping of work. If no claim for
extension is made within three days of occurrence, no claim for
extension may be made.
The other clauses as to schedule in the contract are as follows:
Building pads for Units A&C to be completed by November 1,
1979. The remainder of the building pad areas by December 1, 1979. All
remaining work by February 1, 1980.
Time is of the essence of this Agreement.
Without limiting the provisions of the preceding sentence,
Contractor also agrees to complete the work as rapidly as field
conditions permit ... so as to enable the Contractor to complete the
work within the time limits specified above.
Page 9
I think that this dispute originates with the ambiguous contract
wording "as rapidly as", which gave the Contractor a good excuse for
completing the project behind schedule, even though there are specific due-
date clauses and "Time-of-essence clauses" in the contract. The latter was
caused by omission of the words, "weather-related delays", from the language
of the provision, which make it ambiguous.
In deciding this dispute, the Court relied on the following four general
rules of interpretation of contracts:
(1) When a conflict exists between general and specific
provisions, the specific clauses control.
(2) Written clauses govern printed clauses, since it is presumed
that written provisions received stricter attention from the parties.
(3) Ambiguous terms are to be construed most strongly against
the party who drafts the ambiguous language.
(4) Contracts will be interpreted, insofar as possible, to give
reasonable interpretation to all parts of the contract, and interpretations
which create conflicts will be avoided unless it is unreasonable to do so.
On the issue of delays from schedule, the Court applied rule (4) against
Anderson and held that both the context and the wording of the clauses
unambiguously demonstrate that the timetables in the contract were outside
dates for completion and that the clause was intended only to underline the
essential nature of timely completion. On the issue of notice, the Court
applied rule (4) and held in Anderson's favor that Anderson's failure to
comply with the three-day notice requirement for time extensions could not
constitute a bar to the granting of such extensions since, for whatever reason,
the parties did not include weather-related delays in the notice provision.
I think that both decisions were proper. Neither party could object to
them. On the issue of delay, since Anderson had known of the wet condition
of the soil and took a chance to estimate the schedule assuming an ideal one
of offsite fill, he had to take the responsiblity for the delay. However, on the
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latter issue, as the weather was unusual, nobody could anticipate it.
Therefore, I believe that the Owner should take this risk since only the Owner
could have controlled it by setting another season for this job. I think the
three-day notice provision is not so important because everyone encountered
the unfavorable weather and could expect to be delayed by it.
If I had been the Contractor, I would have submitted two proposals as
to schedule. One would have been based on the ideal condition using the
offsite fill and the other on the wet condition. Then I believe that the
Contractor could have avoided the risk. The Owner, by selecting one of the
proposals, would have taken it. If I had been the Owner, I would have
realized that the schedule was unfavorable since it had been raining
unusually. I, then, would have consulted the Contractor about the future
schedule to determine the best procedure at that time because the project was
mine and I would have been in difficult position if it had been delayed
unreasonably. I believe that there should not have been litigation concerning
this issue if the parties had so acted.
Similar claims to those in Anderson were made in the case of Western
Contracting Co. v. Dow Chemical Co., due to the ambiguous contract words
"Best Efforts". The decisions in McKinney Drilling Co. v. The Collins Co., Inc.
and W.I. Sanford v. G & R Construction contain good examples of applying
these rules of interpretation.
2.1.2 Defective contract documents
The original drawing lacked the information about the dimensions of
easements which was very important to calculate the amount of onsite fill.
However, it was revised prior to the execution of the contract and the Owner
called the Contractor to bring the easements to their attention. In addition to
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this, the discrepancy between the estimated amount of fill and the actual
amount required made this dispute much more complicated.
The Contractor alleged that offsite fill should be extra because the
contract required the use of onsite fill. Anderson claimed that the need for
offsite fill was an extra task and made the plans and specifications defective. 2
Therefore the job could not be performed as contemplated, requiring
Anderson to expend more money and effort than he had planned. Actually,
when Anderson discovered that he had made a miscalculation of the amount
of fill and knew that he could not get adequate onsite fill, he thought that he
could get extra reimbursement for offsite fill no matter how much would be
required believing that offsite fill was not included in the original contract
price.
The Owner alleged that the drawing was not deficient because it had
been revised and the revision had been called to the Contractor's attention
before contract. The Owner denied the Contractor's claim for an increase in
the contract sum based on the proposed use of offsite fill because the Owner
claimed he did not intend to make it extra.
As to the Contractor's responsibility for scrutinizing the contract
document, the contract says;
4.2.1. The Contractor shall carefully study and compare the
contract Documents and shall at once report in writing to the architect
any error, inconsistency or omission he may discover.
2 Drawings were claimed to be deficient in failing to give notice of easements in spite of the
facts that the topographic maps showed the easements and utility line. Anderson claimed this
deficiency caused him to miscalculate the quantity of onsite fill he could excavate from the
pond and to fail to choose a proper excavation technique to yield an adequate supply of
borrowed material. Through these allegations, he tried to make the offsite fill be extra, so
that he could recover for his miscalculation.
Page 12
The contract was for a lump-sum and the following provision was
included for an increase in the contract sum;
2.3.1. If the Contractor wishes to make a claim for an increase in
the Contract sum, he shall give the architect written notice thereof
within 20 days after the occurrence of the event giving rise to such
claim... before proceeding to execute work.
I think that this dispute was mostly attributable to the fact that this
lump-sum contract did not clearly state whether or not the offsite fill was
extra work. This ambiguity affected the contract price seriously. In fact, the
misunderstanding between the Owner and the Contractor as to offsite fill
originated with this dispute.
As to whether the use of offsite fill was an extra for unforeseen
circumstances, the Court held that in a fixed-sum contract, the Contractor was
not entitled to additional compensation simply because unforeseen
difficulties were encountered as long as the Owner did not breach the implied
warranty that conditions were as described in the plans and specifications.
The Court held that the Owner did not warrant the conditions because the
contract contained no changed conditions clause. Also, the Court held that
there were no misrepresentations by the Owner of material facts about the site
conditions, because the inset drawing showed the easements and gave ample
notice of the easements. The Court held that had the Contractor made a more
careful inspection of the site, the ditches would have been discovered.
Therefore, the Court decided that supplying offsite fill was not an extra. As to
the quantity of fill, the Court held that the Contractor may recover the extra
cost due to the differences between the actual ground elevations and those
shown in the drawings. However, the Court held that the Owner was not
liable for expenses incurred by the Contractor due to the Contractor's own
miscalculations with regard to the amount of fill necessary to do job.
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I disagree with this Court decision. Even if the Contractor had utilized
the proper construction method to yield an adequate supply of borrowed
material, the Contractor might have needed to use only offsite fill in order to
complete the job on time, because of the wet condition of onsite fill. Actually,
the Contractor based the dates for completion on offsite material quality and
ideal conditions. Even if the Contractor had accurately estimated the amount
of fill required to fill the site to the final grade, the amount of fill would have
never changed. I believe that the cost of this earth work would have been
much higher than the contract price, even if everything had been the best that
could be expected. Therefore, unless offsite fill was an extra, the Owner could
just take advantage of the Contractor's mistakes, because he could get service
for a much lower price than he should have. I believe that the Court should
have approved the extra cost which would have been required if the
Contractor had performed his work ideally.
If I had been the Contractor, I would have disclosed my mistake to the
Owner as soon as I noticed my miscalculation. Then, the Owner would have
been aware that the amount of fill would have been the same no matter how
I had done the estimation. I could, thereby, have avoided a claim if the
Owner acted reasonably. I believe that it is extremely important to keep a
good relationship between the Owner and the Contractor in order to avoid
claims. The role of Court is quite important in this process: it should make a
fair decision so that nobody can take advantage of the other's mistake.
Otherwise, neither party can trust the other. In this respect, I think that this
case shows many characteristics of construction claims in the U.S. I feel that
each party in the U.S. tries to take advantage of the other through some
loophole in the contract. For example, in this case, even if the contract had
included the provision that offsite fill would not be extra and the drawings
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had been perfect, this claim would have occurred because the Contractor
would have felt that the Owner would have gotten a unfair benefit. As long
as this attitude persists, the number of claims will not decrease no matter how
the contract is revised.
2.2 No onsite project representative
In Anderson, some additional delay was experienced because there was
no project representative of the Owner empowered to resolve disputes and to
render interpretive decisions contemporaeously with the emergence of
problems on the site.
The Contractor alleged that the failure to name a project representative
was a breach of the Owner-Contractor Agreement.
The Owner made the excuse that there was a project coordinator until
early 1980 when the Contractor had been expected to complete his portion of
the work.
As to this matter, the contract included the following provisions;
2.2.2. Architect shall have no authority to execute Change
Orders.
2.2.3. The architect will visit the site at intervals appropriate to
the stage of construction to familiarize himself generally with the
progress and quality of the work...
2.2.17. If the Owner and architect agree, the architect will
provide one or more Project Representatives.
I think that if there had been no problem during the course of the earth
work, there would have been no dispute about this. However, when the
Contractor encountered difficulties to complete the work timely, the problem
was the Owner's uncooperative attitude to expedite the work. While his
failure to name a representative hindered the Contractor from expediting the
work, he blamed the Contractor's failure of timely completion. I think that
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nobody could dispute the Owner's responsibility for the delay in this
situation.
The Court held for the Owner that the failure to name a project
representative during the course of the Contractor's earth work did not
constitute a material breach of the Owner-Architectural agreement and did
not breach the Owner-Contractor agreement at all, where a project
representative could only have referred to the architect's limited authority to
order minor changes in work which could not involve adjustment in
contract sum or extension of time for completion.
I disagree with this decision. The Court thought that since a project
representative has no authority, the failure to name him is not breach of
contract. However, in this case, this decision means that before the bid, the
Contractor should have assumed the risk that he might be required to engage
in time-consuming, long distance correspondence in order to obtain approval
for proposed changes because no onsite authorized project representative
would be present at the development site. I do not believe that any
Contractor would assume such a ridiculous risk as this. I think that even
though the Owner was not in breach of contract, he should have been
penalized for the delay due to the failure to name a representative.
If I had been the Owner, I would have named an authorized
representative as soon as I had known of the emergency situation in terms of
timely completion. Then I would have cooperated with the Contractor to
expedite the work. I think that these attitudes would have prevented
misunderstanding and inspired the Contractor to work harder.
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3. Impossibility of performance
As to examples of claims by Contractors for impossibility of
performance, the decision in the case of H.B.Zachary v. Miles-Sierra is worthy
of discussion.
In Zarchary, the problem was whether oral assurances by government
representatives that marginal material not meeting the specifications could be
used by the Subcontractor made it impossible for the Subcontractor to
perform the work, where the prime contract required that any change of
specifications be made by written change order.
The Contractor asserted that it was not impossible because he
satisfactorily completed the work which the Subcontractor alleged was
impossible after taking it over. The Contractor claimed breach of the sub-
contract.
The Subcontractor alleged that the use of marginal material which
might bring about rejection of the work was too risky and that it was
impossible to perform the job because he was not furnished an adequate
supply of material meeting the specification.
As to this material, the contract says;
Contractor guarantees that material in either Sites 1 or 2 will
meet specifications and in sufficient quantity to complete required
yardage in the pit selected by the Subcontractor.
I think that the Subcontractor's failure to furnish the appropriate
equipment and personnel to do this job was the main reason for this dispute.
The Subcontractor, who was struggling to do the work satisfactorily without
the proper equipment and personnel, sought to get an excuse, "impossibility
of performance", for its failure to perform based on oral notice. From the
Contractor's point of view, the claimed "impossibile performance" was due to
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the Subcontractor's failure to furnish the proper equipment, because the
Contractor completed the job satisfactorily after taking over the
Subcontractor's work.
The Court held for the Contractor in view of two facts: that material
made available by the prime Contractor met the specific gravity requirement
and that the Subcontractor continued performance until the takeover in spite
of its alleged excuse for nonperformance.
I think that there was no absolute "impossibility of performance" here.
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma's opinion was that the rule of supervening
impossibility means not only actual strict impossibility, but impracticability
arising from extreme and unreasonable difficulty, loss, injury or expense
which may be involved. Therefore a decision about whether work is
"impossible" should be based on whether proper preparation is reasonably
done or not. In this case, the Subcontractor failed to furnish the proper
equipment so that he was unable to perform his obligation. The Court made
a decision based on the fact that the Contractor accomplished it satisfactorily
after taking over the Subcontractor's job. However, I think that it might be
impossible for even the Contractor to perform it with the equipment which
the Subcontractor had furnished. Accordingly, if it had been reasonable to
choose the equipment based on the contract document before bid, this
decision should be reversed. As a matter of fact, in the case of Tames W.
Miller v. The City of Broken Arrow, the Contractor was relieved from its
contractual liability because of impossibility of performance, applying the
Supreme Court of Oklahoma's opinion. In this case, the Contractor's
preparation was reasonably based on the contract documents and he was
complying with the contract requirement perfectly and in good faith.
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In the case of Zachary, if the Contractor was at fault, it was in choosing
this Subcontractor. Therefore, if I had been the Contractor, I would have
checked the ability of the Subcontractor more carefully. For example, I would
have checked its past results in performing the similar work and the way in
which it intended to perform it. I might be advised that I would have to take
a risk of failure of performance if I did so. However, I believe that it is best to
cooperate and find out the best way of performing in terms of quality and
price.
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4. Extra work
It is extremely important for Contractors and Owners to know about
the obligations created by the contract since different interpretations about the
obligations of each party under the contract often raise the problem of "Extra
Work." "Extra Work" is one of the major issues in construction projects.
This is usually caused by a "Change Order" or a "Changed Condition".
4.1 Change Order
There are many cases disputing "extra work" such as Service Steel
Erectors Co. v. SCE, Inc., McKinney Drilling Co. v. The Collins Co., Inc.,
Linneman Construction, Inc. v. Montana-Dakota Utilities Co., Inc.,
Environmental Utilities Co. v. Lancaster Area Sewer Authority, E&R
Construction Co., Inc. v. Guy H. Tames Construction Co., and Falcon Tet Co. v.
King Enterprises, Inc. Most of them were caused by failure to comply with the
change clause which requires that each "Change Order" should be written by
an authorized person and that claims must be submitted within a limited
time in order to get additional compensation for the extra work. In most
cases, some implied waiver of the contractual right is at the center of the
dispute, because a contractor would be unable to recover the extra cost
without it.
Usually, Contractors assert that an Owner implicitly waives its contract
rights both to the written authorization requirement and timely claims by its
conduct, such as that the Owner is aware of numerous changes being made
on oral directives, or that the Owner implicitly promises to pay for the extra
work, without any written authorization, or based on the Owner's conduct.
For example, a contractor may claim that the Owner is aware that extra work
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is being done without proper authorization but stands by without protest
while extra work is being incorporated into the project.
The Owner, in order to prevent any implied waiver like this, often
includes a "merger clause" in the contract such as this:
"No oral order, objection, claim or notice given by any party to
the others shall affect or modify any of the terms or obligations
contained in any of the Contract documents, and none of the Contract
documents shall be held to be waived or modified by reason of any act
whatsoever, other than by a definitely agreed upon waiver or
modification thereof in writing, and no evidence of any other waiver
or modification shall be introduced in any proceeding."
Failure to comply with the notice requirements is the main reason for
these disputes. Some of the reasons contractors claim for their failure are the
following:
1) Too busy to get an authorization
2) Too busy to make a claim
3) Oblivious of this requirement
4) Misunderstanding of this requirement
5) Unaware of this requirement
These reasons are basically the Contractor's own fault and he does not
have any basis for the dispute. Nevertheless, why do Contractors make such
claims for extra work? I think that Contractors cannot help doing so because
of the money involved. On the other hand,the Owner can not concede either
for just the same reason.
An important factual issue to be decided by the Court is whether or not
there was a implied waiver of the Owner's contractual right to both the
written authorization requirement and the notice requirement. For example,
in the case of Service Steel Erectors Co. v. SCE, Inc., the Court found no
liability for the claimed extra work, holding that there was no implied waiver
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of these contractual provisions because the general contractor did not enter
into a definite agreement to pay for any extra work, nor was there any other
action demonstrating an intention to abandon the Owner's contractual rights.
I do not think that the basis for this decision is convincing. I think that
these requirements are provisions to prevent the Contractor from doing extra
work arbitrarily so that an Owner can decide what to do by himself.
Therefore, the decision should be based on whether the extra work was what
the Owner intended to do or not. For example, if the claimed extra work is
reasonably necessary, it should be rewarded, regardless of failing to comply
with the requirements, as long as there is no special reason why the Owner
would not do so. Otherwise, the Owner could get a service free.
If I were the Owner, I might pay for the extra work as long as it is
reasonable, because if it is reasonable, the work to be done would be the same
without regard to how he complied with the requirements. I believe that this
is the best way to keep good relations with one another.
4.2 Changed Conditions
There are two types of changed conditions. The first, known as "Type
I" changed conditions, is defined as conditions which vary from the
conditions indicated in the contract documents. The second, a "Type II"
changed condition, is defined as a site condition of a previously unknown
and unusual nature which differs materially from those ordinarily
encountered in the work provided for in the contract.
To establish a "Type I" change, there must be some representation that
reasonably induces a Contractor to believe that the site conditions will be
more favorable than actually encountered.
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"Type II" change conditions, on the other hand, require that the
Contractor show that the conditions encountered were unusual and differed
materially from those he had a reason to expect, considering the nature of the
work in the locale. The conditions encountered by the Contractor do not
have to be natural conditions, but may include any unknown physical
condition that was reasonably unanticipated based upon an examination of
the contract documents and the site. Contractors will be held to the common
knowledge of other Contractors familiar with the area.
Clauses in contracts on these subjects also require that the Owner be
notified in a timely fashion of changed conditions to provide him with the
opportunity to evaluate and implement changes in design or alterations in
method of performance which may become necessary due to the changed
condition. Failure to comply with the notice requirements may present the
Owner with a defense against the Contractor's claim for additional cost for
extra work and cause a dispute.
In most disputes concerning changed conditions, the question is who
has to take the liability for a bad expectation. This is the main point regardless
of the type, since while a Contractor has expectations, it is the Owner who
provides the documentary basis for those expectations.
A Contractor usually asserts that he did not reasonably expect the
unforeseen conditions based on the contract documents. He asserts a change
was caused by defective contract documents in that actual conditions were not
what he expected them to be.
On the contrary, most Owners, in order to shift the risk of unforeseen
circumstances, prefer a contract which contains standard clauses disclaiming
responsibility for accuracy of the information furnished to bidders concerning
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surface and subsurface conditions or requiring a Contractor to verify
specifications by inspecting the site.
Actually, most contracts contain a clause requiring bidders' site
inspection such as the following:
Each bidder shall thoroughly examine and be familiar with the
site of the proposed project and submission of a Proposal shall
constitute an acknowledgement upon which the Owner may rely that
the bidder has thoroughly examined and is familiar with the site. The
failure or neglect of the bidder to fully familiarize himself with the
conditions at the project site shall in no way relieve him from or to the
Contract. No claim for additional compensation will be allowed which
based upon lack of knowledge of the site (from UMPOUA River
Navigation Co. v. Crescent City Harbor District.)
Moreover, some contracts contain clauses disclaiming the accuracy of
information of unforeseen conditions such as following;
All existing ground elevations, utilities, soil conditions, etc., as
shown on the drawings are as reported to the architect by others and
are therefore not guaranteed correct (from M.C.Anderson v. Donald
Golden)
An aim of providing bidders with the site conditions information
despite these clauses is to lower the bid price which bidders submit relying on
the information. Therefore, the logic of the Owner seems to be inconsistent.
The rationale on which Courts make a decision concerning this
inconsistency is summarized in Foster Construction C.A. & Williams Bros.
Co. v. United States;
Normally, bidders will engage in extensive pre-bid inspections of
project sites to avoid losses from unknown subsurface conditions. For
the same reasons, Contractors will build a risk contingency element
into bids, inflating contract prices. If, however, the government
conducts a pre-bid inspection, assuming the burden of investigation,
and, through a changed conditions clause, guarantees that the
Contractor will be compensated for overruns resulting from conditions
not detected by the government's logs, then the inflationary cushion in
bidding should be reduced. (Id. at page 887.)
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For example, in the case of UMPOUA River Navigation Co. v. Crescent
City Harbor District, the Court held:
Provisions in contract including changed conditions clauses
which shift some of the burden of investigation to bidder are narrowly
construed and government disclaimers of responsibility for contractual
indications are disregarded.
As a result, in most disputes about changed conditions, the key point is
whether a Contractor reasonably expected the unforeseen conditions through
the contract documents, regardless of disclaimer clauses.
In the case of UMPOUA v. Crescent, the Contractor, UMPQUA,
claimed extra cost due to different site conditions, alleging that specifications
provided by the harbor district and prepared by Swinc Engineering, Inc.
inaccurately represented soil conditions in the dredging area, that UMPQUA
and a Subcontractor relied on these specifications in submitting contract bids,
and that, during the dredging, the Subcontractor encountered conditions
materially differing from those shown in the specifications, resulting in
unforeseen costs. See Appendix 2 for details.
Three contract clauses, "Examination of Site", "Soil information and
Pile Tests" and "Subsurface Conditions Found Different", were related to this
case.3
3"3. EXAMINATION OF SITE
Each bidder shall thoroughly examine and be familiar with the site of the proposed project
and submission of a Proposal shall constitute an acknowledgement upon which the Owner may
rely that the bidder has thoroughly examined and is familiar with the site. The failure or
neglect of the bidder to fully familiarize himself with the conditions at the project site shall
in no way relieve him from or to the Contract. No claim for additional compensation will be
allowed which is based upon lack of knowledge of the site.
4. SOIL INFORMATION AND PILE TESTS
The drawing show soil test logs and pile test logs reproduced from reports by the district's soil
Consultant. Copies of these reports are on file at the offices of the Engineers and at the District
office and may be examined by prospective bidders. Each bidder shall make his own
evaluation of the information contained in the reports. Neither the Owner or the Engineers
guarantee that the soils borings, pile test logs or other information shown are typical for the
entire site of the work.
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Against the Contractor's allegations, the Court held that the
Subcontractor's reliance on contractual data for dredging information was
unreasonable where the special conditions informed bidders that backup
reports for soil data were available at the harbor district's office but the
Subcontractor made no effort to obtain this information, where the
Subcontractor's dredge captain had encountered rocks on previous occasions
while dredging areas of the harbor near the project site, and where the
Subcontractor's own test results were inconsistent with those shown in
contract plans.
I disagree with this decision. I do not believe it is reasonable for the
engineer to provide bidders with unreliable information. I think that if the
Contractor's reliance on the specifications is unreasonable, the engineer's
provision of unreliable information to bidders should be also unreasonable
since the engineer could have evaluated it based on backup reports and could
have known about boulders from an engineer who was in charge of the
similar project adjacent to this project area. Accordingly, I believe that the
engineer is primarily responsible for not detecting these conditions.
In the case of Al Johnson Const. Co. v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., the
Contractor claimed extra cost due to different site conditions from those
shown in the plans and specifications. The contract clauses relevant to the
21. SUBSURFACE CONDITIONS FOUND DIFFERENT
Should the Contractor encounter subsurface and/or latent conditions at the site materially
differing from those shown on the Plans or indicated in the Specifications, he shall
immediately give notice to the Architect/Engineer of such conditions before they are disturbed.
The Architect/Engineer will thereupon promptly investigate the conditions, and if he finds
that they materially differ from those shown on the Plans or indicated in the Specifications,
he will at once make such changes in the Plan and/or Specifications as he may find necessary,
and any increase or decrease of costs resulting from such changes to be adjusted in the manner
provided in Paragraph 17 of the General Conditions.
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issues in this case are found in the specifications such as examination clause4,
disclaimer clause 5 and the changed condition clause. 6
The Court held for the Contractor that the changed condition clause
had to be given effect since the condition was materially and substantially
different from the conditions disclosed by the contract documents and it was
not possible for bidders to make their own subsurface exploration of site
conditions prior to bidding due to the short time interval between the
invitation to bid and the bid opening and the high water level at that time of
year.
I agree with this decision, since I think that the Owner is basically liable
for the extra cost due to unforeseen circumstances.
4 GENERAL PROVISIONS
Article 7. EXAMINATION OF PLANS, SPECIFICATIONS AND SITE OR WORK.
It shall be understood that the Contractor has, by careful examination, satisfied himself as to
the nature and location of the work, the conformation of the ground, the character, quality and
quantity of the materials to be encountered, the character of equipment and facilities needed
preliminary to and during the prosecution of the work, the general and local conditions, and all
other matters which can in any way effect the work under this Contract....
5 SPECIAL CONDITIONS.
Article 6. SUBSURFACE CONDITIONS.
..... Certain boring information has been obtained for design purposes and the logs of borings are
shown on the plans for the convenience of the Contractor and for such use, if any, as he may at
his own risk desire to make of it. No representations or guarantees are made concerning the
completeness of the boring data. Such data indicates an opinion as to materials encountered at
the specification location of the respective borings and may not represent materials which will
actually be encountered in performing the work....
6 Article 8. CHANGED CONDITIONS.
As the various portions of the subsurface are penetrated during the work, the Contractor shall,
promptly and before such conditions are disturbed, notify the Engineer at the project site and
company in writing if the actual conditions differ substantially from those which were
indicated or normally inherent in the nature of the work or if obstructions obviously foreign to
the natural character of the substratum or previously unknown obstructions are encountered. If
in concurrence therewith the Engineer at the site will promptly submit to the Contractor a plan
or description of the modifications which he proposes should be made in the contract
documents. The resulting increase or decrease in the contract price or time allowed for the
completion of the contract shall be estimated by the Contractor and submitted to the Engineer
at the site in the form of a proposal.....
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5. Suggestions to Avoid Claims
There are many kinds of claims in U.S. construction projects, but all of
the claims ask for additional compensation from the Owner because of "extra
work cost". I reviewed 34 court decisions of construction claims to see how
they are tried in the court and resolved. Figure 1 summarizes the results of
my review. Among the reasons for dispute, "Conflict about interpretation of
the contract documents concerning extra work or changed conditions" is a
major one. Figure 1 shows that this tendency has not changed in the last 30
years. I think this means that revisions to standard form contracts to avoid
claims has not been effective. These revisions have been made by the
representative of one party [engineers or Contractors] and neither side has
cooperated with this work. I think this is the main reason why these form
revisions are biased toward one party or the other and in vain. For instance,
in many cases there were clauses in the contract which try to avoid the
Owner's risk of unknown conditions and impute it to the Contractor. On the
other hand, they put the "changed conditions" clause in the contract to
prevent the bidders from raising the bid price to presume the high risk of
uncertain conditions. Who takes this risk is still ambiguous in the contract.
Who should take what risk? I think that if this question was answered
properly and unambiguously in the contract, construction claims would be
reduced drastically.
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CAUSE Year of
NO. PLAINTIFF & DEFENDANT A B C D contract
1 Eastern Iowa Light and Power Co-op. v. McKenzie * 1950
2 Saddler v. U.S. * 1951
3 Bennett v. U.S. * 1951
4 Barnard-Curtiss Co. v. U. S. * 1953
5 Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. U. S. * 1953
6 Sam Macri & Sons, Inc. v. Oaks Const. Co. * * 1955
7 Macri v. John H. Maxwell & Co. * 1958
8 Fanning & Doorley Const. Co. v. Geigy Chemical Corp. * * 1959
9 H. B. Zachery Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co. * 1960
10 Practical Const. Co. v. Granite City Housing Authority * 1962
11 Goodwin, Inc. v. City of Lafayette * 1963
12 E & R Const. Co., Inc v. Guy H. James Const. Co. * 1964
13 Sanford v. G & R Construction Co. * 1965
14 E.C. Ernst, Inc. v. General Motors Corp. * 1967
15 Elte, Inc. v. S. S. Mullen, Inc. * 1967
1 6 Viglione v. Klefstad Engineering Co. * * 1967
17 Al Johnson Const. Co. v. Missouri Pac. R. Co. * 1968
18 McDowell-Purcell, Inc. v. Manhattan Const. Co. * 1969
1 9 McGovney & McKee, Inc. v. City of Berea, Ky. * 1969
20 Linneman Const., Inc. v. Montana-Dakota Utilities Co., Inc. * 1970
21 Burgess Const. Co. v. M. Morrin & Son Co.,Inc. * 1970
22 W.C. James, Inc. v. Phillips Petroleum Co. * * 1970
23 Nebraska Public Power Dist. v. Austin Power, Inc. * * 1972
24 Environ. Utilities Co. v. Lancaster Area Sewer Authority 1972
25 Umpqua River Navigation Co.v. Crescent City Harbor Dist. * 1973
26 G. C. S., Inc. v. Foster Wheeler Corp. 1974
27 Western Contracting Corp. v. Dow Chemical Co. * 1974
28 Affholder, Inc. v. Southern Rock, Inc. * 1976
29 City of New Orleans v. Vicon,lnc. * 1976
30 Service Steel Erectors Co. v. SCE, Inc. * 1979
31 McKinney Drilling Co. v. Collins Co. ,Inc * * 1979
32 In re King Enterprises, Inc. 1979
33 Anderson v. Golden * 1979
34 Johnson Controls, Inc. v. National Value & Mfg. Co. * 1979
TOTAL 1 8 20 3
A; Insufficient or defective contract provisions or instructions
B; Conflict about interpretation of contract concerning about change condition
C; Conflict about interpretation of contract concerning about obligation, extra work and cost
D; Conflict about interpretation of contract concerning about time extension
Figure 1 Causes of claims
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5.1 Court decisions
Through this research, I felt that the Court decisions were not always
consistent with what I feel is fair. I think that there is a price for each
construction project, were it built ideally, and an Owner should pay at least
this amount of money for such service, no matter what the contract says. I do
not think that it is fair that either side makes a profit by taking advantage of
the other's mistakes only because of what the contract says. I think that a
Contractor is basically in a weaker position than an Owner before entering
into a contract. Consequently, the contract is often favorable to the Owner.
Disclaimer clauses and merger clauses are good examples of this. I think that
Courts should make decisions based on what services an Owner actually got
rather than what a contract says.
For example, in the case of Anderson v. Golden the Owner received
the benefit of offsite fill rather than onsite. Though one of the reasons why
the Contractor used offsite fill was that the Contractor failed to obtain enough
amount of offsite fill due to his own mistake, the other reason was that the
onsite fill was so wet that he could not complete the work on schedule. As a
result, no matter who would have done this job, it would have been
necessary to use offsite fill. However, the Court made a decision against the
Contractor because it construed the contract to be so.
In case of UMPOUA v. Crescent, the Court held that the Contractor
could not recover the extra cost due to unexpected unfavorable conditions
even though no matter who had done the work, such conditions would not
have changed.
I think that such Court decisions lead people to be sly in their dealings
with one another, because one can be rewarded for taking advantage of the
other's mistake. I believe that Courts should make decisions such that the
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Contractor would at least recover the cost which it would have taken if the
work had been done ideally.
5.2 The way to choose a Contractor
There are some cases in which either party may try to find a loophole
in the contract to get extra compensation even though knowing that the fault
was his own. For example, in the case of Linneman v. Montana, I think that
the act of the Contractor, who failed to get the written authorization for extra
work and submit a claim until 10 months after completion of the job, while
the contract required notice within 30 days of completion of the extra work,
was very unreasonable. I cannot understand why he sued the Owner. The
following cases are also good examples of this situation: Goodwin, Inc. v. City
of Lafayette, Environmental Utilities Co. v. Lancaster Area Sewer Authority
and Service Steel Erectors Co. v. SEC, Inc. in which cases the allegations were
clearly untimely and unreasonable. If this were in Japan, these Contractors
would never get future jobs, since every Owner would be aware of their
unreasonable behavior. There are few construction claims in Japan because
every party behaves very reasonably. I believe that if the Owner takes into
account the bidders' past behavior at his award, as it is in Japan, such
unreasonable and time-and-money-wasting litigation as this would be
eliminated.
5.3 Who should take what kind of risk
5.3.1 Unforeseen circumstances
In order to reduce the risk of unforeseen circumstances, we have to
investigate the site of the project. It takes money and time. The more money
and time that is spent on the investigation, the more accurate it usually is.
On the other hand, the increased accuracy makes the cost of the project lower.
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Both time and money are controlled by the Owner. That is, it is the Owner
who makes a decision about how much money and time should be spent for
the investigation. Therefore, I believe that it is most natural and reasonable
that the Owner take the risk of the unknown circumstances. In order to do
so, I would like to recommend a bidding system in which bidders submit all
assumptions about uncertain conditions on the basis of which they estimate
the cost so that an Owner can choose the best Contractor based on their
assumptions and prices, and the Owner takes responsiblity for the
assumption. If the Owner does not want to do so, I recommend he enter a
turn-key contract in which the Contractor takes all kind of risks.
I know some cases in which Contractors dare to assume the ideal
conditions to lower the bid price in spite of expecting that actual conditions
will be worse. In other words, they gamble on the actual conditions and if
they lose, they try to get additional costs for the changed conditions like
Affholder, Inc. v. Southern Rock, Inc. I think that my suggested system can
eliminate such ridiculous litigations as this.
5.3.2 Act of God
In the case of Barnard-Curtiss v. the U.S., a Contractor claimed
additional costs incurred as a result of flood damage. The Court held against
the Contractor's claim that an unprecedented amount of rainfall in a
watershed covered by a dam project was an act of God, but did not excuse the
construction Contractor from timely performance where the Contractor was
still able to perform the work, albeit with more difficulty and expense. I think
that this Court decision was obviously erroneous because there is nothing
impossible in construction projects if there is no limit on expenses.
I think that nobody could reasonably anticipate such an act of God as
occurred in Barnard-Curtiss v. U.S. during performance of work. If anyone
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should take this risk, it would be the Owner, since he took a chance to build a
structure and to avoid damage due to it before the work. A Contractor also
should take some risk because it is common sense that he should expect that
minor damage or disruption might occur during his performance.
Therefore, I strongly recommend that a contract contain a provision
which provides a ratio on which the expense of damage due to an act of God
is borne by both parties.
5.4 Defective contract documents
As to defective contract documents, the party who drafts them is
responsible. I suggest that the drafter of the contract should be responsible for
the ambiguous words, which should not be used in the contract. For
example, "as rapidly as .. ." (Anderson v. Golden) or "use its best efforts"
(Westin v. Dow Chemical) do not accomplish anything but provide a reason
for claims, because these words only give excuses for problems and a loophole
in the contract. The one who has to take each risk of uncertain conditions
should be specified clearly.
If a defect in the contract documents is found, the correction should be
made as quickly as possible and confirmed in writing immediately.
Otherwise, this defect could give a good excuse to the other party and wastes
time and money.
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Appendix 1
1. Eastern Iowa Light and Power Co-op. v. McKenzie, 296 F.2d 295 (8th
Circuit Court of Appeals, 1961)
Cause: C
Parties disputed over whether the construction of a barge channel was
required by the contract. Furthermore, even if it was required, the Contractor
alleged that he did not have to do so since he had no place to deposit
"unstable" dredging material on the site development.
2. P.L. Saddler v. the U.S., 287 F.2d 411 (U.S. Court of Claims, 1961)
Cause: C
This is a claim for contract damages based on a change order issued by
the Owner. The Contractor maintained that required work by the change
order, which increased earthwork, on which the unit price was based, from
7,950 yards to 13,000 yards and necessitated the bringing of equipment 100
miles back to the job site, was outside the scope of the contract.
3. George Bennett Construction Co. v. the U.S., 371 F.2d 859 (U.S. Court
of Claims, 1967)
Cause: C
This is a suit by the Contractor against the government for additional
compensation allegedly due for extra work in excavating for the construction
of a river levee.
4. Barnard-Curtiss Co. v. the U.S., 301 F.2d 909 (U.S. Court of Claims,
1962)
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Cause: B
This is a suit by the Contractor to recover additional costs incurred as
the result of flood damage accruing during the course of its performance of
the construction contract.
5. Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. the U.S., 397 F.2d 826 (U.S. Court of
Claims1968)
Cause: B
This is an action by the Contractor, a road builder, to recover additional
compensation due to the Owner's action of designating substitute borrow pits
to replace pits originally designated in drawings, ordering certain of the
original borrow pits enlarged, and ordering the Contractor to perform borrow
excavation and overhaul far in excess of quantities shown on contract
drawings because of materially different subsurface and/or latent conditions
from those shown on the drawings.
6. Sam Macri & Sons, Inc. v. Oaks Construction Co., 313 F.2d 119 (9th
Circuit Court of Appeals, 1963)
Cause: A, C
This is an action which arose out of a dispute between the Contractor
and the Subcontractor as to whether the work done by the Subcontractor was
"extra" or not and whether damage was due to the Subcontractor's improper
performance and delay, or due to deficiencies in plans.
7. Macri v. the U.S., 353 F.2d 804 (9th Circuit Court of Appeals, 1965)
Cause: C
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This is an action which arose out of a dispute between the Contractor
and the Subcontractor as to whether the extra work done by the Subcontractor
and the subsequent delay were due to foundations for which the Contractor
was responsible or not and whether damages were due to the Subcontractor's
improper performance and delay or not.
8. Fanning & Doorley Const. Co. v. Geigy Chemical Corp., 305 F.Supp.
650 (District Court Rhode Island, 1969)
Cause: A, C
This is a dispute as to who was responsible for the failure of a product
to effectuate its purpose and whether the work by the Contractor was extra or
not in case of failing to get a written authorization.
9. H.B.Zachery Co. v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 391 F.2d 43 (5th Circuit
Court of Appeals, 1968)
Cause: A
This is a dispute between Contractor and Subcontractor as to
impossibility of performance where government specifications for riprap
work on a dam required rock with greater than 2.45 specific gravity and the
prime contract required that any change of specifications be made by written
change order, oral assurances by government representatives that riprap
material not meeting specifications could be used.
10. Practical Construction Co. v. Granite city Housing, 416 F.2d 540 (7th
Circuit Court of Appeals, 1969)
Cause: C
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This is a dispute as to extra work where the Contractor failed to comply
with the contract provisions which required the Contractor to submit protests
to instructions on extra work within ten days after their receipt.
11. Goodwin, Inc. v. City of Lafayette, 418 F.2d 698 (5th Circuit Court of
Appeals, 1969)
Cause: C
This is a dispute as to extra work where the Contractor failed to comply
with the contract provisions that no claims for extra work or extra cost would
be allowed unless a claim was presented with the first estimates filed after
changed or extra work was performed.
12. E & R Construction v. Guy H. James Construction, 390 F.Supp. 1193
(District Court Tennessee, 1972)
Cause: C
This is a dispute between the Contractor and Subcontractor for extra
cost by the Contractor's failure to remove promptly the large quantities of
shot rock which it had wrongfully deposited on the cofferdam system.
13. W.J. Sanford v. G & R Construction Co., 293 F.Supp. 816 (District
Court Mississippi, 1968)
Cause: A
This is a dispute as to the sum of money which G&R contracted to pay
the Subcontractor, Sanford, for the work due to the ambiguous wording of
contract documents.
Page 37
14. E.C. Ernst, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 482 F.2d 1047 (5th Circuit
Court of Appeals, 1973)
Cause: B
This is an action by a Subcontractor against a general Contractor and
Owner for claims for additional costs and increased expenses which resulted
from delay caused by other Subcontractors.
15. Elte, Inc., v. S.S. Mullen, Inc. 469 F.2d 1127 (9th Circuit Court of
Appeals, 1972)
Cause: A
This is an action by a Subcontractor against the Contractor for claims
for additional costs in trying to exploit the unproductive quarry first selected
by the Contractor where the contract required the Contractor to provide the
quarry site.
16. Viglione v. Klefstad Engineering Co., 324 F.Supp. 972 (District Court
Pennsylvania, 1971)
Cause: A, C
This is a dispute as to extra work concerning rock excavation between
the Contractor and Subcontractor where there was a ambiguity between the
general contract and the subcontract in terms of responsibility for
measurement and certification of quantities of rock excavation.
17. Al Tohnson Const. Co. v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 426 F.Supp. 639
(District Court Arkansas, 1976)
Cause: B
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This is an action for additional compensation under changed condition
clauses where actual conditions were substantially different from those
indicated by borings as to which the contract contained disclaiming clauses.
18. McDowell-Purcell, Inc., v. Manhattan Const. Co., 383 F.Supp. 802
(District Court Alabama, 1974)
Cause: A, C
This is a dispute between the Contractor and the Subcontractor as to
who was responsible for the unwatering work as described in their
subcontract agreement.
19. McGovney & McKee, Inc. v. City of Berea, 448 F.Supp. 1049 (District
Court Kentuchy, 1978)
Cause: A
This is a dispute between the Owner and the Contractor as to whether
plans were defective where there was a two-foot discrepancy between ground
water elevation shown on two pages of the engineer's plans.
20. Linneman Const. v. Montana-Dakota Utilities Co., 504 F.2d 1365
(8th Circuit Court of Appeals, 1974)
Cause: C
This is a dispute between the Owner and the Contractor as to whether
the Contractor was entitled to extra compensation where the Contractor failed
to comply with the "extra" clause providing for a written order for any extra
work and for submission of claims within 30 days of completion of the extra
work.
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21. Burgess Const.Co. v. M.Morrin & Son Co., 526 F.2d 108 (10th Circuit
Court of Appeals, 1975)
Cause: D
This is a dispute between the Contractor and Subcontractor as to
whether the Contractor could terminate the Subcontractor when the
Subcontractor failed to complete its performance on time but the Contractor
also delayed the Subcontractor's access to the work site.
22. W.C. Tames, Inc. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 347 F.Supp. 381 (District
Court Colorado, 1972)
Cause: B, C
This is a dispute between the Owner and the Contractor as to whether
"spread moves" of the Contractor's crews were extra or not, whether the
Contractor was entitled to rely on the unscaled, undimensioned "typical
drawing" and whether the contract provisions were unfair to the Owner or
not.
23. Nebraska Public Power Dist. v. Austin Power, 773 F.2d 960 (8th
Circuit Court of Appeals, 1985)
Cause: A, C
This is a dispute between the Owner and the Contractor as to who was
responsible for substantial delays and massive cost overruns. The Owner
mainly alleged that the Contractor failed to provide sufficient organization,
planning, management and direction of its work force on the project. The
Contractor mainly alleged that the problem was due to (1) late and inaccurate
construction and installation drawings; (2) untimely delivery of material and
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equipment furnished by the Owner; (3) requiring to provide labor not
required in the contract without issuing change work orders.
24. Environmental, ETC. v. Lancaster Area Sewer, 453 F.Supp. 1260
(District Court Pennsylvania, 1978)
Cause: C
This is a dispute between the Owner and the Contractor mainly as to
whether the Contractor was entitled to additional compensation for extra
work without extra work orders as required by the contract.
25. UMPOUA River Nay. Co. v. Crescent City Harbor, 618 F.2d 588 (9th
Circuit Court of Appeals, 1980)
Cause: B
See Appendix 2
26. G.C.S., Inc. v. Foster Wheeler Corp., 437 F.Supp. 757 (District Court
Pennsylvania, 1975)
Cause: D
This is a dispute between the Contractor and the Subcontractor as to
whether the Contractor was liable for damages for the delay caused by change
orders, extra work and drawing revisions in case the contract contains a "no
damage delay" clause.
27. Western Contractinjg v. Dow Chemical, 664 F.2d 1097 (8th Circuit
Court of Appeals, 1981)
Cause: A
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This is a dispute between the Contractor and the Subcontractor as to the
construction of "best effort" in the contract provisions.
28. Affholder, Inc. v. Southern Rock, 736 F.2d 1007 (5th Circuit Court of
Appeals, 1984)
Cause: B
This is a dispute between the Contractor and the Subcontractor as to
whether the cost overrun was due to the fact that the location of the tunnel
was changed from the place shown in the bid documents, as well as different
subsoil and water invasion problems encountered at the new location.
29. City of New Orleans, ETC. v. Vicon, Inc., 529 F.Supp. 1234 (District
Court Louisiana, 1982)
Cause: C
This is a dispute between the Owner and the Contractor as to who is
responsible for defective products shortly after the acceptance of the jobs.
30. Service Steel Erectors v. SCE,Inc., 573 F.Supp. 177 (District Court
Virginia, 1983)
Cause: C
This is a dispute between the Contractor and the Subcontractor as to
whether the Subcontractor was entitled to additional compensation for extra
work when he failed to comply with contractual provisions requiring written
approval and timely claims for extra work.
31. McKinney Drilling Co. v. Collins Co., Inc. 701 F.2d 132 (8th Circuit
Court of Appeals, 1983)
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Cause: A, C
This is a dispute between the Contractor and the Subcontractor as to the
wording of the subcontract which seems to be ambiguous and inconsistant
regarding extra work.
32. In Re King Enterprises, 678 F.2d 73 (8th Circuit Court of Appeals,
1982)
Cause: C
This is a dispute between the Owner and the Contractor as to whether
the oral change order was valid where the contract provision required that
changes be in writing and signed by an authorized agent.
33. M.C. Anderson v. Donald Golden, 569 F.Supp. 122 (District Court
Georgia, 1982)
Cause: A, B, C, D
See Appendix 2
34. Johnson Controls, Inc. v. National Valve & MFG., 569 F.Supp. 758
(District Court Oklahoma, 1983)
Cause: C
This is a dispute between the Contractor and the Subcontractor as to
whether the Subcontractor was entitled to additional compensation for
acceleration and extra work where he failed to give written application for an
extension as required by the subcontract.
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Appendix 2
Attachment of photocopy of M.C. Anderson v. Donald Golden, 569
F.Supp. 122.
Attachment of photocopy of UMPOA River Navigation Co. v. Crescent
City Harbor District, 618 F.2d 588.
569 FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT
M.C. ANDERSON, d/b/a M.C. Anderson
Construction Company, Plaintiff,
V.
Donald GOLDEN, Defendant.
CV481-237.
United States District Court,
S.D. Georgia,
Savannah Division.
Dec. 28, 1982.
Contractor, after filing materialman's
lien against owner, brought action against
owner seeking money allegedly due under
contract, remuneration in quantum meruit,
reimbursement of certain funds expended
during course of job, and attorney fees.
Owner asserted counterclaim for delay
damages, cost of correcting or completing
work, expenses incurred, and slander of ti-
tle. The District Court, Edenfield, J., held
that: (1) owner's failure to name project
representative during course of earth mov-
ing contractor's work did not constitute
breach of owner-contractor agreement; (2)
owner should not be saddled with expenses
incurred by contractor due to contractor's
own miscalculations; (3) contractor could
sue on contract despite architect's failure to
issue certificate of completeness and owner
was entitled to rely on and enforce terms of
contract; (4) owner's authorization of in-
crease in contract sum for offsite fill
estopped him from arguing that offsite fill
was never extra; (5) owner did not implied-
ly warrant accuracy of his agent's investiga-
tion; (6) contractor executed partial lien
waivers with each payment request; (7)
owner failed to establish cause of action for
slander of title; and (8) contractor was not
entitled to attorney fees.
Order accordingly.
1. Contracts *=242
Contrary to earthwork contractor's as-
sertions that contract proviso that contrac-
tor agreed to complete work as rapidly as
field conditions permitted amended timeta-
ble to allow additional time in event of
adverse conditions, context and wording of
proviso unambiguously demonstrated that
paragraph setting forth timetable contained
outside dates for completion and that provi-
so was intended only to underline essential
nature of timely completion.
2. Contracts 4*242
Contractor's failure to comply with
three-day notice requirement for time ex-
tensions could not constitute bar to grant-
ing of such extension where, for whatever
reason, parties did not include weather-re-
lated delays in notice provision.
3. Contracts *=312(1)
Failure to name project representative
during course of earthwork contractor's
work did not constitute material breach of
owner-architectural agreement and did not
breach owner-contractor agreement at all,
where project representative could only
have referred to architect's somewhat limit-
ed authority to order minor changes in
work which could not involve adjustment in
contract sum or extension of days for com-
pletion.
4. Contracts *=199(1)
Though easements were not otherwise
pointed out to earthwork contractor's em-
ployee, where inset drawings on additional
plans delineating easements, along with ad-
monition that those areas are not to be
disturbed by contractor, would have given
ample notice of existence of easements
which are not to be excavated had contrac-
tor's employee studied drawings, contractor
was not precluded from accurately estimat-
ing amount of available offsite fill on
ground that drawings were deficient in fail-
ing to give notice of easements.
5. Contracts *=232(1)
Developer did not misrepresent amount
of fill available in retention ponds; thus
developer was not liable for expenses in-
curred by earthwork contractor due to con-
122
tractor's own miscalculations with regard to
amount of fill necessary to do job.
6. Contracts =287(2)
Architect's certificate to construction
lender for purposes of loan disbursement
was not equivalent to certificate of final
payment contemplated by owner-contractor
agreement which was required prior to pro-
ceeding with suit on contract.
7. Contracts 0=287(1), 300(3)
Where owner terminated contractor's
contract by ordering him off job, and subse-
quently reinstated contractor only to allow
him to mitigate damages, with express
understanding that notice of termination
would remain effective, and owner substan-
tially contributed to lengthy delays and
failure of contractor to complete work ac-
cording to timetable, which was reason giv-
en for termination of contract, owner by his
own act prevented completion in accordance
with terms of contract thereby making it
impossible for contractor to secure archi-
tect's certificate; thus, contractor could sue
on contract despite architect's failure to
issue certificate of completion.
8. Contracts 4=278(1)
Owner was entitled to rely on and en-
force terms of owner-contractor contract
despite failure to agree with architect as to
appointment of project representative,
where provision of owner-contractor agree-
ment referring to nomination of onsite
project representative was not mandatory.
9. Contracts 0198(1)
Contractor who held himself out as ex-
perienced in earthwork and storm-drainage
system work was bound to exercise reasona-
ble professional skill in estimating cost of
work and in performing job.
10. Contracts =143.5
Contract will be interpreted, insofar as
possible, to give reasonable construction to
all parts of contract, and construction of
contract provisions as conflicting will be
avoided unless it is unreasonable to do so.
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11. Contracts 0=232(1)
Where contract provided that contrac-
tor furnish all materials and supplies neces-
sary to perform work, specifications provid-
ed that contractor could acquire additional
fill from offsite locations if he chose to do
so, postbid addendum contained "revision"
or "clarification" which required excavation
of borrowed material from adjacent reten-
tion pond areas, and contract finally exe-
cuted by parties indisputably required con-
tractor to excavate retention areas, con-
tract did not limit contractor to use of
onsite fill, thereby making offsite fill extra.
12. Contracts *=241
Where owner authorized purchase of
offsite fill when, because of moisture con-
tent of onsite fill, site could not be proof-
rolled without bridge layer of offsite fill,
condition surely not foreseen by either con-
tractor or owner, and contractor only re-
quested such authorization when onsite ma-
terial was saturated to point that it could
not be proofrolled or would entail delays if
used, parties did not modify contracts to
make offsite fill extra on all occasions.
13. Estoppel =78(1)
Owner's authorization of increase in
contract sum for offsite fill used as bridg-
ing lift to alleviate unforeseen proofrolling
problems estopped owner from arguing that
offsite fill was never extra under contract.
14. Contracts *232(1)
Extra or additional work is work not
contemplated in original specification.
15. Contracts *=232(1)
If work performed is covered under
lump-sum contract, contractor cannot con-
sider cost of performing as extra.
16. Contracts =232(1)
In fixed-sum contract, contractor is not
entitled to additional compensation simply
because unforeseen difficulties are encoun-
tered.
17. Contracts *232
If services are not contemplated by
original agreement and are necessary to
perform work, law will apply promise to
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pay for extra services even though contract
is fixed-sum contract.
18. Contracts *=232(1)
Where contractor was clearly required
under terms of contractor-owner agreement
to bring site to final grade levels, contractor
was required to fill site no matter how
much fill was required, contract did not
specify amount of fill to be placed on site,
there was no supplemental agreement to
pay, and owner repeatedly informed con-
tractor that he would not pay for offsite fill
that he chose to use because of poor quality
)f onsite fill, contractor could not recover
:osts of offsite fill, even though quality of
material was unforeseen circumstance to all
parties.
19. Implied and Constructive Contracts
464
Where filling of site was clearly con-
;emplated by contract, contractor could not
*ecover in quantum meruit cost of onsite
'ill merely because quality of material was
Inforeseen circumstance to all parties.
!0. Contracts *=303(1)
Where cost of compliance exceeds con-
emplated cost, contractor who submits bid
ias little choice but to bear burden of addi-
ional expenses.
U1. Contracts 0=205
Implied warranty by owner that condi-
ions are described in plans and specifica-
ions is not vitiated by standard clauses
lisclaiming responsibility for accuracy of
lata or requiring contractor to verify speci-
ications by inspecting site.
2. Contracts *=93(1)
In order to calculate bid, bidders must
e able to rely on representations by owner
is to subsoil conditions and other nonobvi-
,us conditions.
3. Contracts 0*205
Where contract specifically provided
hat contractor was responsible for investi-
,ating soil and subsoil conditions, for visit-
ng site and familiarizing himself with local
onditions, for correlating drawings and
pecifications with existing conditions,
ground elevations, utilities, and soil condi-
tions as shown on drawings were expressly
not guaranteed to be correct, and contract
contained no changed-condition clause, con-
tract squarely placed risk of uncertainty as
to site conditions on contractor and owner
did not impliedly warrant the accuracy of
his agents' investigation.
24. Contracts =232
Purpose of changed-condition clause of
contract is to relieve bidder of risk of en-
countering adverse subsurface conditions.
25. Fraud 011(1)
Even where no implied warranty by
owner that conditions are as described in
plans and specification exists, owner may be
liable to contractor due to misrepresenta-
tions of material facts of onsite conditions.
26. Fraud =18, 23
In order to prevail on claim of misrep-
resentation, contractor asserting misrepre-
sentations by owner must satisfy two re-
quirements: first, that he was not reason-
ably able to discover true facts for himself
and second, that misrepresentation was ma-
terial.
27. Contracts 0=94(1)
What constitutes reasonable ability to
discover true facts about contract site de-
pends upon time constraints involved, na-
ture of alleged misrepresentation, and
whether owner expected that bidders would
rely on specification and plans provided.
28. Fraud *=21
Where drainage ditches were alluded to
in specifications, and had contractor's em-
ployee done more careful inspection of site,
ditches would have been revealed, and con-
tractor was put on notice of easements and
utility lines which they contained, plans and
specifications were not defective in regard
to ditches and easements so as to make
owner liable for misrepresentations of ma-
terial facts of offsite conditions.
29. Contracts 0199(1)
Where contractor would have had to
incur expense in surveying site himself,
with no assurance that his bid would be
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accepted, and more careful inspection of
site would not have revealed discrepancy in
amount of fill actually needed to raise site
to finished grade levels and amount called
for on owner's drawings, contractor justifi-
ably relied on architect's plans in construct-
ing bid and estimating quantity of fill need-
ed.
30. Contracts 4232
Where contractor discovered variance
~b twan arnlint f fill t U rb.I ll d d daaAaA ama
that called for on drawings and made for-
mal request for increase in contract sum,
based on results of independent survey re-
quested by architect, contractor acted as
expeditiously as he could.
31. Contracts =232(1)
Where existing ground elevations of
site were different than those shown on
drawings made by owner's architect, con-
tractor could recover costs of additional cu-
bic yards of fill required as well as cost of
survey required by owner's architect.
32. Mechanics' Liens 0=208
Lien waivers are valid and enforceable
under Georgia law even against contractor's
contention that his intention was only to
subordinate his lien claims to that of lender.
33. Mechanics' Liens 0=208
Waivers of lien rights must be distin-
guished from contractor's affidavits which
in usual course of business are sworn state-
ments by contractor that he has paid sub-
contractors reasonable value or agreed price
of work done or material furnished.
34. Mechanics' Liens *=236
Only sworn statement by contractor
that he has paid subcontractors reasonable
value or agreed price of work done or mate-
rial furnished upon completion of work is
binding release of materialman's lien rights.
35. Mechanics' Liens =15(1)
Contractor's sworn statement that he
has paid subcontractors reasonable value or
agreed price of work done or material fur-
nished does not refer to contract price be-
tween owner and contractor.
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36. Mechanics' Liens 0=208
Contractual language whereby cohtrac-
tor stated he waived, released, and relin-
quished any and all claims for rights of lien
which he may have had, and that he waived
and released his rights to file mechanics' or
materialman's lien against property consti-
tuted waiver of lien rights and was not only
an intent by contractor to subordinate his
lien claims of that of lender.
37. Contracts *=232
Where contractor waived any lien
rights with regard to amount of contract
sum already paid, no sum could be asserted
for any amount which exceeded agreed-
upon contract price, even though costs of
completion may have exceeded contract
sum; furthermore, owner was entitled to
deduct cost of completion from balance due.
38. Libel and Slander 4=130
Under Georgia law wrongful filing of
mechanic's lien may give rise to action for
slander of title.
39. Libel and Slander 0=139
Where owner not only failed to prove
malice on part of contractor who filed
wrongful mechanic's lien but also failed to
demonstrate that he sustained any special
damages, owner failed to establish elements
necessary to state cause of action for slan-
der of title. Ga.Code, § 105-1411; O.C.
G.A. § 51-9-11.
40. Contracts *211
Implied and Constructive Contracts
0=65
Time-of-the-essence clauses are en-
forceable in Georgia, however, Georgia fol-
lows rule which allows recovery in quanturr
meruit by plaintiff who was in substantia
breach of contract, as long as breach is no
willful or deliberate.
41. Contracts =,301
Although that time was of essence wa
made abundantly clear in earth-movin.
contract, where except for some minc
items of contract, earthwork contractc
completed rough grading of storm sewc
system work, and owner accepted benefit (
performance, even though contractor faik
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to timely complete contract and failed to
complete some portions of work at all, con-
tractor was entitled to recover value of his
labor and services at amount equivalent to
unpaid contract price minus setoff for ex-
penses incurred by owner to complete or
correct. contractor's work.
42. Contracts 0232(1)
Contractor is not entitled to additional
compensation for work necessitated by his
own inadequate performance.
43. Costs *173(1)
Under statute which allows recovery of
attorney fees if defendant has acted in bad
faith, or has been stubbornly litigious, or
has caused plaintiff unnecessary trouble
and expense, award of attorney fees is pre-
cluded where there is bona fide controversy
or genuine dispute. Ga.Code, § 20-1404;
O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11.
44. Costs f=173(1)
Under Georgia law attorney fees are
not allowed where amount recoverable is
considerably less than amount sought. Ga.
Code, § 20-1404; O.C.G.A. § 183--11.
45. Federal Civil Procedure 0=2737.5
Where bona fide controversy existed as
to amount due contractor for work per-
formed in earthmoving aspect of develop-
ment project, contractor was not entitled to
award of attorney fees. Ga.Code, § 20-
1404; O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11.
Stanley E. Harris, Jr., Savannah, Ga., for
plaintiff.
Robert J. Campbell, Kansas City, Mo.,
and Aaron L. Buchsbaum, Savannah, Ga.,
for defendant.
ORDER
EDENFIELD, District Judge.
The above-captioned case came on for
bench trial before this Court on August 24,
1982. After hearing three days of testimo-
ny and reviewing numerous exhibits and
depositions, the Court now makes the fol-
lowing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law.
Introduction
This suit involves a classic confrontatio:
between the developer of a project, McAl
pin Square Shopping Center, and his con
tractor, in this case, the rough-grading ano
storm drainage system contractor. The
conflict which arose during the course of
the work was exacerbated by the weather
and other adverse conditions at the site of
the development. Each party accused the
other of various breaches of the contract
The contractor, M.C. Anderson, doing busi-
ness as M.C. Anderson Construction Compa-
ny, filed a materialmen's lien against the
McAlpin Square property. He subsequent-
ly brought this action, which was removed
to this Court on the basis of diversity juris-
diction, against Donald Golden, the develop-
er of McAlpin Square. He seeks monies
allegedly due under the contract, remunera-
tion in quantum meruit, reimbursement of
certain funds expended during the course of
the job, and attorney's fees. Golden, in
turn, asserted a counterclaim for delay
damages, for the cost of correcting or com-
pleting work under Anderson's contract, for
expenses incurred, and for slander of title.
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. The Parties and the Contract
1. Plaintiff, an earthwork contractor,
entered a lump sum contract to perform
site work at the proposed McAlpin Square
Shopping Center, with Donald Golden, a
real estate developer with a leasehold in the
property. The site is located in Chatham
County, Georgia, northwest of the intersec-
tion of Victory Drive and Wallin Street.
2. Anderson received an invitation to
bid on the development in late May, 1979.
In order to prepare bids on the site grading
and storm sewer construction work, pro-
spective bidders were provided with a pack-
age of information prepared by Golden's
architect, John Carey. The package includ.
ed a bound book entitled "Specifications for
Site Grading and Storm Sewer Work for
the McAlpin Square Shopping Center"
which contained detailed bidding and soil
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boring information and a site grading plan
dated May 23, 1979. The scope of the site
work initially included clearing the site,
raising it to the required elevation, rough-
grading, and general preparation of build-
ing pad and parking area sites. Bidders
were instructed to carefully examine the
site, the drawings, and other bid documents
and to verify conditions and locations in the
field.
8. Anderson, the only earthwork con-
tractor to bid the job, submitted a bid of
$575,695.00 on June 12, 1979. In order to
achieve a reduction in this price, John Carey
engaged in discussions with Steve Chavis,
Anderson's employee in charge of the McAl-
pin Square bid. After the elimination of a
soil stabilization mat and the addition of a
provision requiring the excavation of fill
from retention areas adjacent to the site,
Anderson submitted a revised bid of $425,-
000.00 on June 21, 1979. After further
discussions and negotiation, Anderson sub-
mitted a final proposal on August 15, 1979,
for $425,000.00, which was substantially
similar to the June 21, 1979 bid. Golden
accepted this bid and after adding $4,250.00
for the bond premium, the contract price
was $429,500.00.
4. Prior to the execution of the contract,
Carey issued a revised grading plan dated
August 23, 1979, which superceded the May
23rd plan. In addition to other minor con-
figuration changes, the dimensions of ease-
ments in the retention pond area, which had
been inadvertently omitted on the May 23rd
drawings, were shown.
5. Anderson and Golden executed the
standard AIA contract on September 12,
1979. The contract documents included the
Owner-Contractor Agreement, the August
23rd drawings, the Specifications, the In-
structions to Bidders, the Uniform Propos-
als, Addendum No. 1 (Post-Bid), and the
General and Supplemental General Condi-
tions. The contract contained a merger
clause. Pertinent portions or paraphrases
of portions of the contract documents are
set out below.
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a) The Agreement
Art. 2. The Contractor shall furnish all
supervision, labor, materials, equipment,
transportation and supplies necessary to
perform the site grading work and storm
sewer work for the Project.
Notwithstanding anything set forth in
the contract documents to the contrary,
Contractor acknowledges and agrees that
Contractor has investigated soil and subsoil
conditions of the site to its full and com-
plete satisfaction.
Art. 8. Work to be commenced as soon
as possible and substantial completion to be
achieved according to terms of Schedule A.
Art. 6. Final payment when work com-
pleted, contract performed and final Certi-
fication for Payment issued by architect
b) Schedule A
(1) Building pads for Units A & C to be
completed by November 1, 1979. The re-
mainder of the building pad areas by De-
cember 1, 1979. All remaining work by
February 1, 1980.
Time is of the essence of this Agreement.
Without limiting the provisions of the
preceding sentence, Contractor also agrees
to complete the work as rapidly as field
conditions permit ... so as to enable the
Contractor to complete the work within the
time limits specified above.
c) General Conditions
Art. 1.2.2. By executing the Contract,
the Contractor represents that he has visit-
ed the site, familiarized himself with the
local conditions under which the work is to
be performed, and correlated his observa-
tions with the requirements of the Contract
documents.
1.2.3. The Contract documents are com-
plementary, and what is required by anyone
shall be as binding as if required by all.
2.22 Architect shall have no authority
to execute Change Orders.
2.2.3. The architect will visit the site at
intervals appropriate to the stage of con-
struction to familiarize himself generally
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with the progress and quality of the
work ....
2.2.17. If the owner and architect agree,
the architect will provide one or more
Project Representatives.
4.2.1. The Contractor shall carefully
study and compare the Contract Documents
and shall at once report in writing to the
architect any error, inconsistency or omis-
sion he may discover.
4.8.1. Contractor ... shall be solely re-
sponsible for all construction means, meth-
ods, techniques, sequences and procedures
and for coordinating all portions of the
work under the Contract. If Contractor
shall have knowledge of same, he shall noti-
fy owner and architect of any actual im-
pending or probable shortages of labor or
material or of other factors which may af-
fect adherence to the progress schedule.
6.1.8. The owner will provide for the
coordination of the work of his own force
and of each contractor with the work of the
Contractor, who shall cooperate therewith
as provided in Paragraph 62.
8.1.3. The date of substantial completion
of the work or designated portion thereof is
the date certified by the architect when
construction is sufficiently complete, in ac-
cordance with the contract documents, so
the owner can occupy or utilize the work or
designated portion thereof for the use for
which it is intended.
8.2.2. Three-day notice of delay from
act, neglect or default of architect, owner,
contractors, fire, stopping of work. If no
claim for extension made within three days
of occurrence, no claim for extension may
be made.
12.8.1. If the Contractor wishes to make
a claim for an increase in the Contract sum,
he shall give the architect written notice
thereof within 20 days after the occurrence
of the event giving rise to such claim ...
before proceeding to execute work.
d) Uniform Proposal
Scope of work. "Bidder" ... has become
familiar with the general requirements and
local conditions affecting the costs relating
to this proposed project.
UP4. No change in the work which
affects the Contract price shall be imple-
mented by the Contractor.
e) Specifications
Art. 10.9. Bidders are advised that the
time element for the completion of the job
will be one of the major considerations in
awarding the contract. The Contractor,
however, should estimate his time accurate-
ly as he will be required to meet his time
schedule.
f) Supplementary General Conditions
0201b. Before submitting a proposal,
bidders, general contractor and all subcon-
tractors shall carefully examine the draw-
ings and specifications, and fully inform
themselves as to all existing conditions.
0202. Contractor's Responsibility
a. Site Inspection: The site where the
work is to be constructed shall be carefully
examined, the drawings and specifications
read, and the Contractor shall thoroughly
understand all requirements before work is
begun. All existing ground elevations, util-
ities, soil conditions, etc., as shown on the
drawings are as reported to the architect by
others and are therefore not guaranteed
correct. The Contractor shall verify all
conditions and locations in the field and
accept same unless he shall report any dis-
crepancy to the architect prior to submit-
ting his bid.
0217. Pay Requests
After the first monthly pay request each
subsequent request shall be accompanied by
a waiver of lien, signed by the General
Contractor, covering the full amount of all
payments received as of that date.
0304d. The fill shall consist of sandy
clay, or other granular nonexpandable ma-
terial of law plasticity, hauled in if neces-
sary.
0305. Retention and Borrow Pit Areas
As long as Contractor excavates the re-
tention areas to the elevations noted on the
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plan, he may acquire additional fill from
offsite if he so chooses.
0310. Sub-surface Investigation Report
A complete copy of the sub-surface inves-
tigation report is included for the Contrac-
tor's use and guidance. Any unusual condi-
tion found shall be brought to the attention
of the architect before proceeding with the
work.
g) Addendum No. 1 (Post Bid)
The following revisions and clarifications
shall be made to the drawings and specifica-
tions, dated May 23, 1979.
8.e. Excavate borrow material from ad-
jacent retention pond areas.
8.g. The maximum elevation in the re-
tention basin shall be left at El. 1'.
6. The job which Anderson finally con-
tracted to perform was essentially two-fac-
eted:
(1) Clear, fill, and rough-grade the site
(2) Excavate retention ponds to a maxi-
mum of one foot above sea level elevation.
At the time of his final proposal, Ander-
son apparently contemplated a balance job.
Chavis had estimated that to reach the fin-
ished grade levels, 114,000 cubic yards of fill
would have to be placed on the site. Exca-
vation of the fill from the borrow pits
would, in turn, leave the retention ponds at
a maximum elevation of plus one, after the
unsuitable soil (overburden) was replaced in
the bottom of the pits. The reduced figure
of the final proposed price was based in
part on the availability of on-site fill. Both
Anderson and Chavis understood, however,
that the contract required M.C. Anderson
Construction Company to meet the final
contours whether the amount of fill exceed-
ed or fell short of the quantity Chavis had
estimated would be needed.
7. The soils engineer's report contained
in the specifications stated that the larger
borrow area (Pit A) contained 18 feet of
good usable fill overlain by an average of 7
feet of overburden. This amounted to 29,-
000 cubic yards of fill per acre. There were
6.67 acres, exclusive of the easements; thus,
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approximately 190,000 cubic yards of fill
would be available for use from Pit A.
Hussey and Gay, a civil engineering firm,
later estimated the quantity of usable fill as
approximately 112,000 cubic yards. Both
Whitaker Laboratory, Inc. and D.E. Hill
Engineers, who investigated the subsurface
conditions, noted that the soil was slow-
draining and that the site was normally
wet.
Chavis noted that the area "was sort of a
wet site" (Chavis Deposition at 43) when he
walked the perimeter of the site. He did
not further inspect the interior of the site
because, according to Chavis, he was hin-
dered by the dense undergrowth which cov-
ered it.
[1] 8. After discussing with Golden
and Carey the timetable for completion,
Chavis arrived at a schedule which was
incorporated into the contract. (Schedule
A). Despite the report on the condition of
the soil, his own observation that the site
was wet and his general awareness of the
weather during the winter months, Chavis
based the dates for completion on off-site
material quality and ideal conditions. At
trial, Anderson argued that the proviso at-
tached to Schedule A that the "Contractor
S.. agrees to complete the work as rapidly
as field conditions permit" amended the
timetable to allow additional time in the
event of adverse conditions. Both the con-
text and the wording of the proviso unam-
biguously demonstrate, however, that the
preceding paragraphs setting forth the
timetables contained outside dates for com-
pletion and that the proviso was intended
only to underline the essential nature of
timely completion.
Anderson did not meet any of the Sched-
ule A deadlines for completion.
IL The Work, The Delays, and
The Disputes
9. Anderson and Golden executed the
contract on September 12, 1979. Ander-
son's crew, with Chavis in charge, began
work during the week of September 15th.
Shortly after the work had begun, Carey, at
Golden's request, wrote a letter to Chavis
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concerning Item 8(e) of Addendum No. 1,
which specified that borrow material was to
be excavated from the adjacent retention
pond areas. That item, Carey explained,
was "more restrictive than intended," (D-
15):
You may ... secure fill material from
offsite sources if you wish as long as it is
acceptable material, the retention area is
lowered to at least elevation 1' and the
finished site is left at the new grades
shown on the plans.
[2] 10. From the outset, Anderson's
crew encountered difficulties on the site.
The primary problem was the high moisture
content of the soil. Before borrow material
could be placed on the site, the soil had to
be dried through stockpiling and aeration,
processes which slowed the progress of the
work. Beginning in November and contin-
uing through Spring, 1980, unusually fre-
quent rains occurred, aggravating the mois-
ture problem. Because the rain saturated
the site, work was hindered on clear days.
Anderson submitted two requests for exten-
sions of time, the first on December 14,
1979, detailing 37 days lost to rain, and the
second on February 8, 1980, (36 days lost).
Anderson claimed a total loss of 52 working
days to rain, 10 days for drying and stock-
piling material, and 11 days for mucking
and backfilling. The contract contained a
three-day notice requirement for extensions
but weather-related delays were inadvert-
ently omitted from the language of the
provision. It is undisputed that Anderson
did not comply with the three-day notice
provision.'
11. Some additional delay was experi-
enced due to the absence of a local project
representative empowered to resolve dis-
putes and render interpretive decisions con-
temporaneously with the emergence of
problems on the site. The general condi-
tions provided that "[i]f the Owner and
Architect agree, the Architect will provide
one or more Project Representatives to as-
sist the Architect in carrying out his respon-
1. The failure to comply with the three-day no-
tice requirement for time extensions could not
constitute a bar to the granting of such exten-
sibilities at the site." The Agreement en
tered by Golden and Carey provided tha
the owner and architect would nominate
project representative for the project. Car
ey testified that a project representativc
was appointed for the general contractor's
portion of the work but that none was
named for Anderson's contract.
The Owner-Contractor Agreement de-
nominated the architect the owner's repre-
sentative and required him to make periodic
visits to the site. He was not required to be
continuously present on the site. The archi-
tect was authorized to render necessary in-
terpretations for the progress of the work
upon written request by either the owner or
the contractor and to order minor changes
in the work which would not involve an
adjustment in the contract sum or an exten-
sion of the dates for completion. Only the
owner, however, could institute change or-
ders.
Because no onsite project representative
was present at the development site, Chavis
was required to engage in time-consuming,
long distance correspondence in order tc
obtain approval for proposed procedures
Delays resulted because of the circuitou,
route such communications had to follow
However, a soil technician, either an em
ployee of Whitaker Laboratory, Inc. or Jo(
Whitaker himself, was present on the site
to advise Chavis on soil-related problems
Roy Hussey supervised the storm drainag,
system work. Golden's failure to appoint :
project coordinator after the general con
tractor, McDevitt & Street, came on the jol
in early 1980 is completely understandabl
since Anderson had been expected to com
plete his portion of the work by Februar3
and thereafter Golden continued to expec
expeditious completion of the job. More
over, both Anderson and McDevitt & Stree
assured Carey that they would coordinat'
their work and that it would be unnecessar
to assign Anderson's contract to McDevit
& Street for coordination purposes.
sions since, for whatever reason, the parties di(
not include weather-related delays in the notict
provision.
130
ANDERSON
Cie as 56s F.Su
[3] Thus, the failure to name a project
representative during the course of Ander-
son's work, particularly in view of the fact
that a project representative could only
have referred to the architect's somewhat
limited authority, does not constitute a ma-
terial breach of the Owner-Architect Agree-
ment and does not breach the Owner-Con-
tractor Agreement at all. The omission did
contribute to Anderson's failure to timely
complete the work.
12. In December, 1979, while excavating
fill from Pit A, Anderson's crew encoun-
tered a utility line and damaged a sewerage
pipe. Work was delayed while the sanitary
sewerage was cleaned up and a rerouting
structure erected. Because of the presence
of the sewerage and utility lines, fill could
not be excavated from that area and the
quantity of fill available from the retention
basin was reduced. Chavis claimed that he
was unaware of the easements and utility
lines therein because Carey's plans did not
disclose their existence. The easements did
not appear on the May 23rd plans because
the easement information was not signifi-
cant in May of 1979 since the specifications
contemplated using offsite fill and there
was no clear requirement for a retention
area. The dimensions of the easements
were added to the August 23rd drawings
and the contractor was warned that the
easements were to remain "undisturbed."
The presence of utility lines within the
easements was not disclosed though Carey
and his assistant had in their possession
topographic maps showing the easements
and utility lines. After sending the August
23rd drawings to Chavis, Carey attempted
to bring the easements to Chavis' attention
by phone conversation and correspondence
but Chavis misconstrued his reference to
"easements" and interpreted Carey's re-
marks as references to the storm drainage
system to be constructed.
[4] Though the easements were not oth-
erwise pointed out to Chavis, the inset
drawing on the August 23rd plan delineat-
ing the easements, along with the admoni-
tion that these areas were not to be dis-
turbed by the contractor, would have given
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ample notice of the existence of the ease-
ments which were not to be excavated had
Chavis or another Anderson employee stud-
ied the August 23rd drawings. Chavis tes-
tified that he did not learn of the presence
of the easements and utility lines until the
lines were exposed during excavation.
Only at that point did he look at the August
23rd drawings and notice the easements
and the qualifying remark. Hence, any al-
legations that the drawings were deficient
in failing to give notice of the easements
and that the plaintiff was therefore unable
to accurately estimate the amount of avail-
able onsite fill is clearly meritless.
13. During the course of the work, there
were five written change orders instituted
as provided in the contract which increased
the contract sum from $429,500.00 to $464,-
953.50.
a) Change Order No. 1, dated September
27, 1979, for $16,562.00 was for additional
fill material to raise the finished grade level
six inches.
b) Change Order No. 2, dated October 30,
1979, was for $9,525. Replacement of un-
suitable material excavated from the reten-
tion basin comprised $7,525. Because of the
high moisture content of the natural soil,
the building pad for Unit C could not be
proofrolled in order to ascertain whether
soil needed to be replaced. The soil techni-
cian on the site recommended using an ini-
tial layer of offsite fill as a bridging lift to
alleviate this problem. Chavis followed his
advice and requested an add in the contract
sum for the purchase of 2,000 cubic yards of
offsite fill. Golden approved the request
and instituted an add of $2,000.00 for the
purchase of the offsite fill. Chavis had
offered to supply the fill for $2,000.00, rath-
er than at the unit price of $3.00 per cubic
yard.
c) Change Order No. 8 which engendered
turmoil both during the course of the work
and during the trial requires some discus-
sion of events that ensued prior to its is-
suance. During December of 1979, after
Anderson had failed to meet the deadlines
for completion of the building pads for
Units A and C, methods of expediting the
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work were discussed. The quality of the
onsite fill, aggravated by the heavy rainfall,
was such that substantial amounts of time
passed between laying each lift of fill.
Chavis recommended the use of drier offsite
fill on Units A and C at a cost of $1.50 per
cubic yard. Golden declined to treat this
item as an extra. Subsequently, in early
January, Chavis reported to Golden that
Unit C could be completed in a timely man-
ner if offsite fill was utilized. Golden then
agreed to split the cost of the offsite fill
with Anderson, each to pay $8,625. Chavis
promised that the work on Unit C would be
completed within 8 or 4 days. Although the
fill was purchased and the work performed,
it was several weeks before the Unit C
building pad was eventually completed be-
cause of heavy rainfall during January.
Anderson and Chavis orally notified Golden
of the rain delay during the last week of
January and documented the days lost to
rain in a letter to Carey dated February 8,
1980.
Change Order No. 3, including $2,665.00
for the removal of unsuitable material in
Unit B and $8,625.00 for one-half of the
cost of offsite fill for Unit C was prepared
by Carey and signed by him on January
28th. On or around the same day, Golden
discovered that due to the rain delay, An-
derson had just begun to bring in the off-
site fill. By letter dated January 30, 1980,
Golden informed Anderson that although it
was Anderson's responsibility to provide the
material to fill the site, Golden had gratui-
tously offered to pay part of the cost of
offsite fill in order to expedite the work.
Chavis received the change order and
signed it on March 7, 1980. On March 24th,
Golden struck through the second item, for
the offsite fill, and executed the change
order, leaving the $2,665.00 item. He then
sent the revised change order to Anderson,
pointing out the stricken item and explain-
ing that he had reversed the amount for the
offsite fill because of his discovery that
Anderson had raised a number of matters
which would require an adjustment of the
contract price, over which Golden did not
intend to negotiate. At trial, Golden ex-
plained that his decision not to pay was
SUPPLEMENT
based on Chavis' failure to complete the
work within the time specified in their ver-
bal agreement.
d) Change Order No. 4, dated March 19,
1980, was for $4,484.00 for storm drainage
revisions due to interference with a previ-
ously undiscovered city force main and for
an additional manhole. Chavis did not exe-
cute this change order because he disagreed
with the amount. Carey had reduced the
amount due submitted by Anderson.
e) Change Order No. 5, dated June 19,
1980, for $1,466.00 authorized payment of
the amounts claimed by Anderson which
had been removed by Carey in preparing
Change Order No. 4. Chavis also refused to
execute this change order.
14. In addition to these authorized
change orders, by letters dated February
20, 1980, Anderson submitted requests for
adds of $10,350.00 for 6,900 cubic yards of
fill to be used as a bridging lift for Unit D
and $46,847.50 for 18,739 cubic yards of fill
which represented the quantity of fill re-
quired to bring the site to the final grades
above and beyond the quantity indicated by
Carey's drawings. Both requests were de-
nied. In February, 1980, at a meeting held
at Sambo's Restaurant attended by Carey,
Chavis and others, Chavis notified Carey
that the settlement plates had indicated a
variance in the elevations noted on the Car-
ey drawing and the actual existing ground
elevations. Carey requested an indepen-
dent survey. Joseph Helmly of Helmly,
Purcell & Associates, an engineering and
surveying firm, performed a survey of the
site in March of 1980.
Helmly compared the quantity of fill re-
quired to bring the site to final design using
the elevations of contours on Carey's draw-
ing with the amount of fill needed based on
his survey of the existing ground level and
found that 7,895 cubic yards of fill above
and beyond that indicated by Carey's Au-
gust 23rd drawing would be required to
reach the finished grades.
Helmly also calculated the amount of ma-
terial needed to fill ditches on the site, some
of which did not appear on Carey's drawing.
Carey and his assistant, Ron Juhnke, con-
ceded that not all of the ditches shown on
the topographic map on which they relied
were reflected on their sitework drawings.
Anderson was put on actual notice of the
existence of the drainage ditches, however,
by the soils report contained in the Specifi-
cations. Moreover, he had a duty to inspect
the site himself in order to verify site condi-
tions and to note any discrepancies with the
drawings. Helmly calculated that to fill
the ditches not shown would require 3,853
cubic yards of fill. And if one and one-half
feet of top soil were stripped from the sides
and bottom of the ditches, an additional
2,541 cubic yards would be needed. The
total amount of fill required over and above
that indicated by the Carey drawings, ac-
cording to Helmly's calculations, was 13,789
cubic yards in compacted state. Allowing
for a 30% increase in volume in fluffed
condition, this translates into 17,926 cubic
yards. Helmly's calculations were not prof-
fered and the difference in his final figure
and Chavis' estimate of 18,739 cubic yards
was not explained.
At the time that Helmly surveyed the
site, fifty to seventy-five per cent of it had
been cleared and the ditches had been filled.
Helmly testified that he did not take into
account the six-plus inches of soil stripped
away in the clearing process. He also testi-
fied that the omission of some of the
ditches from Carey's drawing was immate-
rial because, viewing the job overall, the
sitework "balanced out."
Helmly also compared the contours on
Carey's drawing with the spot elevations
shown on a topographic map prepared by
Leigh Gignilliat in 1970 which had been
verified as accurate by Golden's civil engi-
neer, Roy Hussey, and on which Carey had
relied in preparing his site plans. He found
them remarkably similar. Carey utilized
contours spaced at two-foot intervals rather
than at one-foot intervals. Although there
was a great deal of testimony that one-foot
contour intervals were customarily used in
the Chatham County area, Chavis testified
2. Concededly, this figure is somewhat arbi-
trary. However, without more data than was
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that the two-foot contour intervals did not
cause him problems. The Gignilliat draw-
ing showed spot elevations between eight
and six feet whereas the contour lines on
the Carey drawing, by their very nature,
showed no elevation below eight feet Ap-
parently, Chavis did not utilize the process
of interpolating between two contour lines
in order to determine elevations lower than
eight feet. Though spot elevations may
have been more useful to Chavis, the Carey
drawing was not defective because of the
use of two-foot contour intervals, particu-
larly in view of the fact that the specifica-
tions disclosed numerous elevations below
eight feet. At any rate, Helmly concluded
that the elevation differences on the two
drawings were minimal.
Helmly's comparison of the Gignilliat and
Carey drawings demonstrated that the
omission of the ditches and the minimal
elevation discrepancies ultimately made no
difference in the work on the McAlpin
Square site. The yardage reflecting the
amount of material necessary to fill the
ditches will therefore be disregarded. The
Court also finds that the testimony regard-
ing the amount of fill needed to reach final
contours based on existing ground eleva-
tions as compared with the quantity needed
according to the contours on Carey's draw-
ing is unreliable to the extent that Helmly
did not take into account the amount of soil
stripped away in clearing the site.
The difference in cubic yardage actually
required and that required according to the
Carey drawing, as calculated by Helmly,
was 7,895 cubic yards. This figure trans-
lates into 10,263 cubic yards in fluffed con-
dition. If one-half of the site had been
cleared with a maximum loss of .5 foot of
top soil, approximately 7,698 cubic yards (in
fluffed condition) 2 more than required by
the Carey drawing would have to be placed
on the site to reach final elevation. There
are several ways to account for this appar-
ent discrepancy between the existing
ground elevations and those indicated on
the Carey drawing. Chavis could simply
presented, a more accurate amount cannot be
calculated.
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have failed to accurately interpolate be-
tween the contours to reach the actual
ground elevations. However, his discovery
of a discrepancy is supported by Helmly's
survey. The defendant suggests that the
variance can be explained by Helmly's fail-
ure to take into account the stripping of up
to six inches of soil during the clearing
process. Because Carey relied on the Gig-
nilliat topo to prepare his drawing, it seems
logical to infer from the evidence of mini-
mal differences in the Carey and Gignilliat
elevations that only minimal disparities ex-
isted with regard to the existing ground
elevations. It is probable, however, that
the ground elevations changed to some ex-
tent between 1970, when Gignilliat prepar-
ed his topo and 1979, when Carey drafted
his plans. Whether this was indeed the
case could have been demonstrated to Carey
had Roy Hussey, who was employed to veri-
fy the Gignilliat topo, actually checked the
spot elevations. That he did not do so was
established at trial by his own admission
that he had never done a complete topo
himself but had only performed spot checks
on the borders of the site.
The Court finds that the evidence prepon-
derates in favor of the plaintiff and credits
Helmly's testimony insofar as it establishes
that some amount of fill was required
above and beyond that indicated by the
Carey drawing. The Court finds this
amount to be 7,698 cubic yards. Because,
as will be discussed, onsite fill was or should
have been available to correct this deficien-
cy, the unit price for onsite fill, $2.50 per
cubic yard, will be employed to determine
the cost of the additional fill.
15. On November 14, 1980, nearly two
months after removing his crew from the
site, Anderson submitted a pay request in
which he included a claim of $219,729.00 for
73,243 cubic yards of offsite fill at $3.00 per
cubic yard. This figure reflects a truck
count kept by Chavis during the course of
the project. At trial, Chavis testified that
85,013 cubic yards of offsite fill were hauled
onto the site, the cost of 73,243 cubic yards
3. The evidence with regard to the 73,243 cubic
yards of offsite fill was extraordinarily confus-
of which has not been paid by Golden.
Chavis itemized the total amount, as fol-
lows:
Difference in
Carey and
Gignilliat
1) plans: 18,789 cu. yds.
288 acr lost
from reten-
tion areas be-
cause of ease-
menuit X
depth of 10
2) ft.: 41,000 cu. yds.
Change Order
8) No. 1: 6,25 cu. yds.
Raising paved
4) areaoneinch: 2,000 cu. yds.
Replacement of
unsuitable
5) material: 2,088 eu. yds.
Initial lift on
6) Unit D: 6,900 cu. yds.
Initial lift on
7) Unit C: 2,000 cu. yds.
Lift prior to sur-
charge on
8) Unit C: 5,750 cu. yds.
TOTAL: 85,018 cu. yds.
The first item has previously been dis-
cussed, as have the seventh and eighth
items both of which were subjects of
change orders, albeit that the eighth item
was later reversed. The sixth item was also
the subject of a request for a change order,
which was denied. The Court is puzzled by
the inclusion of the third item. Change
Order No. 1 authorized the payment of the
purchase price of 6,625 cubic yards of onsite
fill at $2.50 per cubic yard. Whether, as
appears likely, the plaintiff eventually used
offsite fill to raise the site as required by
Change Order No. 1 and therefore seeks
payment of the difference in the unit price
for on and offsite fill, $.50 per cubic yard,
was never explained on the record. Sub-
tracting from the total the items for which
payment was made (at least in part) leaves
76,388 cubic yards of offsite fill for which
no payment was made. As will be noted,
this amount correlates very closely to Chav-
is' truck count.3 Other than the authorized
ing. At his deposition, Chavis could not
account for the use of this quantity of offsite
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change orders and the denied requests for
change orders, the record does not contain
any indication that Chavis submitted claims
for an increase in the contract sum based on
the proposed use of offsite fill, until the
final pay request in November, 1980. The
contract required the contractor to give no-
tice of a claim for an increase in the con-
tract sum "within twenty days after the
occurrence of the event giving rise to such
claim." (General Condition 12.8.1). Failure
to comply with the stipulated procedure
would render the claim invalid.
Aside from this technical defense to the
claims for items 2, 4, and 5, another ques-
tion arises with regard to the 41,000 cubic
yards of offsite fill allegedly required be-
cause of the depletion, in mid-May, of the
retention ponds. Chavis calculated that
2.83 acres of fill were lost due to the exist-
ence of the easements. That Chavis had
notice of the easements which were to re-
main undisturbed has already been dis-
cussed. Moreover, he based his assessment
of the deficit on excavation of the pits to a
depth of ten feet. There is no doubt that
more fill was available in the retention
ponds, but because of the construction tech-
nique implemented, that is, the replacement
of the overburden into the ponds after re-
moval of the good fill, the contractor could
not retrace his steps and reach the conced-
edly available fill after he realized his mis-
calculation of the quantity of fill he could
excavate from the ponds. The owner and
contractor had agreed upon utilization of
this method of disposal of the overburden
but the contract did not control the depth to
which the ponds could be excavated as long
as the ponds were left at a maximum plus-
one elevation after replacement of the over-
burden. Chavis did not know the depth to
fill. For instance, his truck count for October
showed that 9,000 cubic yards had been hauled
onto the site. However, he submitted a claim
for only 2,000 cubic yards. He also testified
that one-half of the 73,243 cubic yards of off-
site fill was used before he depleted the reten-
tion ponds, as a mixture with the onsite fill.
There was some evidence of the use of offsite
fill to construct haul roads and plaintiffs coun-
sel suggested that offsite fill was used for filling
ditches. Indisputably, no claims for change
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which the ponds had been excavated. Had
Chavis been aware of the easements from
the beginning of the work, as he should
have been, he could have changed his exca-
vation technique in order to obtain more
onsite fill. Anderson conceded that the re-
tention ponds would have yielded sufficient
fill if not for the placement of the overbur-
den into the bottom of the ponds after
excavation of the usable fill.
Chavis testified that 111,896 cubic yards
of fill was excavated from the retention
ponds. Other testimony and documentary
evidence, based on cross-sectioning of the
retention ponds after excavation of the fill,
demonstrated that the figure is closer to
90,000 cubic yards. According to Chavis,
85,013 cubic yards of offsite fill was hauled
onto the site. Thus, the amount of fill
actually used exceeded by approximately
60,000 cubic yards Chavis' estimate that the
job would require 114,000 cubic yards of fill.
The natural inference to be drawn from the
foregoing facts is that Chavis incorrectly
estimated the amount of fill needed in pre-
paring the plaintiff's bid. When it became
apparent to him and to Anderson that the
job would cost more than they had calculat-
ed, they decided to seek an increase in the
contract sum. Their failure to request in-
creases in the contract sum in accordance
with their truck counts each month sup-
ports the conclusion that they fully expect-
ed to bear the expense of the offsite fill in
acknowledgment of their obligation to fill
the site to the final grades, no matter how
much fill was required or where the fill was
obtained. The plaintiff now seeks to re-
coup the costs of the offsite fill incurred
because the construction method they uti-
lized failed to yield an adequate supply of
borrow material.
orders were submitted with regard to the use of
offsite fill for haul roads or filling ditches.
Based on the similarity of the figures, the Court
can only conclude that by the time of trial,
Chavis had found a way to account for the
73,243 cubic yards, in the manner set out
above. Because of the inclusion of some items
which were never explained, the inconsisten-
cies in his deposition and trial testimony, and
his continued confusion at trial, the Court can-
not find Chavis' calculations credible.
I
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[5] The record is devoid of evidence that
Carey misrepresented the amount of fill
available in the retention ponds and the
defendant should not be saddled with ex-
penses incurred by the plaintiff due to his
own miscalculations with regard to the job.
The defendant should not be required to
increase the contract sum by the price of
the off site fill which the plaintiff had no
evidenced intention of claiming as an extra
at the time he planned to purchase it.
Moreover, a claim for an add two months
after Anderson's crew left the job fails to
satisfy the contractual provision governing
the procedure for asserting claims for in-
creases in the contract price.
16. In March, 1980, after a meeting on
the site of the project, Golden set up a new
timetable for completion, as follows:
1) C Unit [Kroger]-overburden must
be completely off site by March 19 ... 2)
B Unit--overburden is to be completed
and on site by March 14 with consolida-
tion completed and overburden removed
no later than April 26 ... 3) D Unit--
Overburden is to be completed and on site
by April 2nd with consolidation complet-
ed and overburden removed no later than
May 17 ... 4) Remainder of work-all of
the remaining work is to be 100 percent
completed and all of your men and equip-
ment off the site on or before June 1st.
This would include the consolidation.
Unit A had been completed in early Febru-
ary. The surcharge (overburden) was re-
moved from Unit C on March 19, 1980.
Final density tests on Unit B were per-
formed on April 25, 1980, and Whitaker
issued his certificatioi~ of completion on
April 28, 1980. On Unit D, the surcharge
was removed on May 30, 1980. Whitaker's
letter certifying completion was dated June
30, 1980. Whitaker issued a qualified certi-
fication of completion of the parking area
on August 15, though he testified that he
could have done so as early as June 30th.
His certification was conditioned on remov-
al of unsuitable material, regrading and
recompaction.
Delays in completion of the work in ac-
cordance with the new schedule resulted in
part from continued rainfall and -the -pres-
ence of the general contractor's crew whose
materials and supplies interfered with the
progress of the sitework. The parking lot
area was found to contain unsuitable mate-
rial which also delayed the filling of the
site. Golden contributed substantially to
this delay by neglecting to deliver written
authorization of the removal and replace-
ment of the unsuitable material. Anderson
stood ready with his equipment to perform
the work for three weeks awaiting Golden's
go-ahead. When no authorization was
forthcoming, Anderson withdrew his equip-
ment. A picket of the site in May halted
work for two or three days. During July,
Anderson's crew was hampered by the pres-
ence of raw sanitary sewerage flowing into
the storm line. Together with McDevitt &
Street's people and city personnel, Ander-
son undertook a clean-up operation. This
further delayed completion.
During a substantial part of the summer
months, Anderson's crew was rough-grad-
ing the parking lot area. After they had
completed the grading, McDevitt & Street's
base subcontractor noted disparities in the
grades. Chavis testified in his deposition
that McDevitt & Street "was having a prob-
lem with the grades that we had set,"
(Chavis Deposition at 100), and that Ander-
son therefore undertook to correct the inac-
curacies by preparing a grid system and by
regrading, in doing so, raising the area to
be paved one inch. Though Carey stated at
trial that he thought the grid system was
unnecessary, he did check and approve the
grid system and raising of the site. Ander-
son does not seek to recover the cost of
preparing the grid system. He does, how-
ever, seek recovery of $7,000.00 which he
paid to Shuman, McDevitt & Street's pav-
ing subcontractor, for fill brought in by
Shuman to correct the disparity. Appar-
ently, the correction of the grades by rais-
ing the area one inch also accounts for the
2,000 cubic yards of offsite fill included in
Chavis' itemization of the offsite fill used
on the site.
17. Pursuant to Golden's inquiry, Carey
submitted his opinion on July 24, 1980, that
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just cause existed for termination of Ander-
son's contract. That same day, Golden me-
morialized by letter a conversation with Joe
Whitaker in which Whitaker opined that
more than $15,000.00 worth of work re-
mained to be done under the Anderson con-
tract. Golden had previously given Ander-
son and his bonding company, Sentry Insur-
ance Company, notice that the contract
would be terminated if the work was not
completed in a timely manner. According-
ly, by letter dated July 24, 1980, Golden
terminated the contract because of the
"lengthy delays and failure to complete the
job within the times provided." (Defend-
ant's Exhibit 6-49).
Anderson, by counsel, objected to the ter-
mination and offered to undertake to com-
plete portions of the work. After a tele-
phone conversation with Golden on August
4th, Anderson, again by counsel, reiterated
his offer to perform mutually agreed-upon
items of work-filling an overexcavated
area of retention pond B and rough-grading
behind Unit B. Anderson's bonding compa-
ny reconfirmed this offer and set a ten-day
period for completion. Golden's attorney
contacted Anderson's attorney on August
11th and set forth the terms and conditions
for Anderson's return to the job. It was
understood that Anderson would be permit-
ted to do the work in order to mitigate
losses and that the notice of termination
would not be withdrawn. On August 12th,
Golden withdrew permission to proceed
pending resolution of certain matters at an
onsite meeting with Anderson, McDevitt &
Street personnel, Carey and others. On
August 20th, Golden reirlstituted the letter
agreement. In the meantime, Golden hired
other contractors to perform certain items
under the Anderson contract.
18. During the August onsite meeting,
Anderson discovered that McDevitt &
Street was using plans dated December,
1979, which showed several different and
4. At the southeast corner of Unit D, the De-
cember plan shows a finished elevation of 13'6"
where Anderson's plan shows nothing. An ele-
vation of 14'3" for the sidewalk and 13'9" for
the curb, not shown on Anderson's plan, ap-
pear directly in front of Unit D on the Decem-
additional grades than those shown on An-
derson's plans, the August 23rd drawings as
revised in October. Some of the finished
floor level elevations for sidewalk and curb
areas were different on the two sets of
plans and some of the final elevations did
not appear on Anderson's plans.' Anderson
was required to leave the site at eight
inches below finished floor level, thus he
had to know the correct finished floor levels
in order to properly grade the site.
18A. Except for certain items which will
be discussed hereinafter, Anderson complet-
ed the sitework and pulled his crew from
the development site on or around Septem-
ber 17, 1980. He has not received payment
on pay request No. 9 for $7,776.00; al-
though Golden drew the check for payment,
Golden's bank refused to honor it. Pay
request No. 10 was itemized as follows:
Contract reten-
tion (includes
total amount
of Change Or-
der No. 3, be-
I. fore reversed)
Offsite fill (73,-
243 cu. yds. at
$8.00/cu. yd.
and 850 cu.
yd. at
$2.50/cu. yd.
used as pipe
backfill by
utility con-
e tractor)
Regrading park-
ing area after
utility con-
tractor dis-
3. turbed it
Storm drain re-
4. visions
Interference
5. manhole
Payment bond
premium on
additional
6. work
$ 63,000.00
219,875.00
5,250.00
6,600.00
950.00
2,720.00
ber plan. The same elevations, omitted from
Anderson's plan, are given for the sidewalks
and curbs in front of Unit C, and the Unit B
sidewalk and curb area elevations are different
on the two plans.
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Item 2 has previously been discussed and
revised, except as to the 350 cubic yards
allegedly used as pipe backfill. No evidence
was offered as to this item. Nor was any
evidence offered with regard to Item 3.
Change Order No. 4 included $5,485.00 for
the storm drainage revision. Chavis refus-
ed to execute it because he disagreed with
the price; however, he did not explain why
the assigned cost was inaccurate. Item 5
was included in Change Order No. 5, which
Chavis also refused to sign. Again, he did
not explain why he refused to do so. After
revising the figures in accordance with the
foregoing discussion, the plaintiffs tenth
pay request includes the following:
Unpaid Contract
Sum
Additional fill
required be-
cause of dis-
crepancy in
plans (7,698
cu. yds. x
2. $250/cu. yd.)
Payment bond
3. premium
TOTAL
$63,000.00
19,245.00
2.72P.00
$84~95.00
The plaintiff also seeks recovery of addi-
tional costs incurred in completing the work
and of fees paid to third parties, as follows:
Additional Costs
Paid to Shuman
Construction
1. Company $ 7,4264
Grade crews (13
days at
$1,050.00 per
2 day) 13,650.00
The reason for the second item was not
clear but it possibly represents the regrad-
ing performed after implementation of the
grid system.
Paid to Third
Parties
Helmly, Purcell
1. field topo
Helmly, Purcell
2 calculations
Helmly, Purcell
8. calculations
Bonding compa-
ny attorney's
$ 57200
1,863.00
825.00
4 expenses 5,168.79
Anderson gave notice of bad faith to the
defendant and therefore seeks attorney's
fees totalling $26,803.
S19. At approximately monthly intervals
throughout the job, Anderson submitted ap-
plications for periodic payments accompa-
nied by signed lien waivers and contractor's
affidavits. Anderson routinely signed these
lien waivers until May 16, 1980, when his
attorney objected to signing the lien waiver
accompanying pay request No. 7. There
was a conflict in the testimony as to wheth-
er an understanding existed between the
parties' attorneys to limit the effect of the
May 16, 1980 affidavit. Anderson testified
that he understood that the May 16th affi-
davit as well as the other affidavits were
lien subordination documents only, as op-
posed to waivers of lien rights. According
to Anderson's attorney, this was indeed the
agreed-upon position as to the affidavit ac-
companying pay request No. 7. Golden's
attorney did not recall reaching such an
agreement.
The illogic of Anderson's stance with re-
gard to the partial lien waivers and contrac-
tor's affidavits is apparent upon reviewing
the letter attached to and incorporated into
the contract signed on September 12, 1979.
In that letter, which Anderson read and
signed, Golden informed the contractor that
at such time as the prospective lender filed
its mortgage of record on the property, the
contractor would be required to subordinate
any lien rights to the lender's first mort-
gage. Golden obtained a lender in March,
1980, and requested the execution of a lien
subordination agreement. Thus, the lien
waivers and contractor's affidavits signed
during the interim period before acquisition
of the mortgage could not logically have
been construed as mere lien subordination
documents. And since Anderson was noti-
fied in March of 1980 of the necessity of
executing a lien subordination agreement,
it is difficult to believe that two months
later he or his attorney could have inter-
preted the lien waiver documents attached
to pay request No. 7 as a lien subordination
agreement.
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20. Golden counterclaimed alleging
damages as a result of the delay in comple-
tion of the sitework which necessitated ad-
ditional expenditures, for monitoring and
inspection work performed by Whitaker
Laboratory and Roy Hussey as well as for
payment of construction loan interest. He
also alleges that by virtue of the delay, his
tenants could not enter the premises as
early as they had hoped and thus he seeks
recovery of lost rentals. In addition, he
contends that he paid Ledbetter Construc-
tion Company $1,237.33 s and Shuman Con-
struction Company $7,547.72' to complete
various items which were within Anderson's
contract and were not performed by Ander-
son. According to Whitaker's assessment
of the work performed by Shuman, only
$6,443.25 of the amount paid Shuman can
be attributed to the Anderson contract.
Golden also seeks recovery of $500.00 for
the improper location of a catch basin;
however, the Court can find no evidence to
support this item. Therefore, it will be
denied.
Of the other items not completed by An-
derson, the majority were extras under the
contract. Two items of the storm sewer
work remain to be completed; however, the
City of Savannah precluded completion of
certain aspects of that work. The installa-
tion of drainage pipes to the Casey Canal,
Hussey testified, will cost approximately
$800. Anderson also failed to comply with
the contractual provision requiring him to
keep a truck count of the good fill removed
from the retention basins. Hussey per-
formed a cross-section of the pits to as-
certain the quantity.
Golden alleged further damages as a re-
sult of the filing of the materialman's lien,
basing his theory of recovery on slander of
title. He testified, however, that he has not
had a bona fide offer for a sale or joint
venture.
5. This figure represents the cost of mucking the
top foot of an area in the northwest corner of
the rear parking area and placing the material
on the bank of retention pond B to correct the
angle of the slope left by Anderson.
6. According to Whitaker, only two items in
Shuman's bill are attributable to Anderson's
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Introduction
[6] Before embarking on an application
of the legal theories to the facts of this
case, it is necessary to determine whether
the plaintiff may sue on the contract and
whether the defendant may rely on the
terms of the contract. It has been consist-
ently held in Georgia that where the con-
tract stipulates that final payment to the
contractor shall be due and payable upon
the issuance of an architect's certificate of
completion, it is essential to allege compli-
ance with this condition in order to main-
tain an action to recover the balance due
under the contract or to enforce the collec-
tion thereof by foreclosure of a material-
man's lien. Southern Manufacturing Co. v.
RL. Moss Manufacturing Co., 18 Ga.App.
847, 856, 81 S.E. 263 (1913). The Owner-
Contractor Agreement provides that final
payment shall be due to the contractor
when the work has been completed, the
contract fully performed, and a final certifi-
cate for payment has been issued by the
architect. The only certificate, other than
those for progress payments, which appears
in the record is one given by the architect
to the construction lender for the purpose
of loan disbursements. Though the plain-
tiff argued that this certificate is equiva-
lent to the certificate of final payment con-
templated by the contract, the Court cannot
so conclude. It does not resemble the cer-
tificate, which must be acquired prior to
proceeding with a suit on the contract.
The condition will be excused where the
owner "by his own act rendered it impossi-
ble for the contractor to secure the approval
and certificate of the architect. .. ." 17A
CJ.S. § 499(7), at 758. The Georgia courts
follow this reasoning: "if the completion of
contract: the placement of foreign borrow over
a drain pipe along Victory Drive and grading
for curbs and gutters. Backfilling under the
curb line behind Sambo's and around the catch-
basin in the front parking lot would have been
an extra under the Anderson contract.
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the contract was prevented by the party
otherwise having the right to insist on the
architect's certificate, this is equivalent to
completion of the contract...." Gellis v.
B.L.I. Construction Co., 148 Ga.App. 527,
535, 251 S.E.2d 800 (1978). See also Allen v.
Moore, 77 Ga.App. 426(1), 49 S.E.2d 121
(1948).
[7] Golden terminated Anderson's con-
tract and ordered him off the job. He
subsequently reinstated Anderson only to
allow him to mitigate losses, with the ex-
press understanding that the notice of ter-
mination would remain effective. Thus,
the owner by his own act prevented comple-
tion in accordance with the terms of the
contract thereby making it impossible for
Anderson to secure the architect's certifi-
cate. Moreover, the owner substantially
contributed to the lengthy delays and fail-
ure of Anderson to complete his work ac-
cording to the timetable, which were the
reasons given for termination of the con-
tract.
[8] The plaintiff vigorously asserts that
the defendant cannot rely on the terms of
the contract because he committed a breach
by failing to agree with the architect as to
the appointment of a project representa-
tive. Although this omission undoubtedly
caused delays in completion of the work,
the Court cannot find that Golden breached
the Owner-Contractor Agreement since the
provision therein for the nomination of an
onsite representative was not mandatory.
The plaintiff seeks to take advantage of the
concededly mandatory term of the Owner-
Architect Agreement with regard to the
appointment of a project representative by
arguing that as a beneficiary of the obliga-
tions created by the Owner-Architect
Agreement, damage to him was a foreseea-
ble consequence of the omission. See Rho-
des-Haverty Partnership v. Robert & Co.
Associates, 163 Ga.App. 310, 312, 293 S.E.2d
876 (1982). With this much I agree, but I
cannot follow such reasoning any further
(particularly where there was little if any
evidence upon which to base a finding of a
breach of the Owner-Architect Contract as
opposed to a mutual modification) to hold
that the defendant cannot therefore rely on
the terms of the Owner-Contractor Agree-
ment.
Therefore, I find that Anderson may sue
on the contract despite the architect's fail-
ure to issue a certificate of final payment
and that Golden is entitled to rely on and
enforce the terms of the contract.
[9] 1. In entering the lump sum con-
tract for the site and storm drainage work,
Anderson held himself out as experienced in
earthwork and storm drainage system
work. He was thus bound to exercise rea-
sonable professional skill in estimating the
cost of the work and in performing the job.
See Day & Zimmerman, Inc. v. Blocked Iron
Corporation of America, 200 F.Supp. 117
(E.D.Pa.1960). During the course of the
project, Anderson found that he had to
perform additional work and incur addition-
al expenses in order to complete the job
according to the specifications. He now
seeks to recover some of these costs as an
"extra," based on the unit prices set out in
the contract. He premises this right to
recovery on two theories: (a) the contract
required the use of onsite fill and made
offsite fill an extra; (b) the plans and speci-
fications were defective, therefore the job
could not be performed as contemplated,
requiring Anderson to expend more money
and effort than he had planned.
a) The Court must construe the contract
to determine whether it called for the ex-
clusive use of onsite fill from the borrow
pits. If it did not, a second question arises
as to whether the parties, by their conduct,
modified the contract to make offsite fill an
extra.
[10] Some elementary rules of construe-
tion guide the Court in making its determni-
nation. A contract will be interpreted, in-
sofar as possible, to give a reasonable con-
struction to all parts of the contract, Morri-
son-Knudson Co. v. United States, 184
Ct.Cl. 661, 397 F.2d 826, 842 (Ct.Cl.1968),
and constructions of contract provisions as
conflicting will be avoided unless it is un-
reasonable to do so. Id. "'Where the plans
and specifications are by express terms
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made a part of the contract, the terms of
the plans and specifications will control
with the same force as though incorporated
in the very contract itself."' Warren v..
Gray, 90 Ga.App. 898, 401, 83 S.E.2d 86
(1954) (quoting 9 AmJur. § 11, at 11).
[11] The pertinent portions of the con-
tract were set out above. The contract
provided that the contractor shall furnish
all materials and supplies necessary to per-
form the work. The specifications provided
that the contractor could acquire additional
fill from offsite locations if he chose to do
so. The post-bid addendum contained a
"revision" or "clarification" which required
the excavation of borrow material from ad-
jacent retention pond areas.
The contract as finally executed by the
parties indisputably required Anderson to
excavate the retention areas. When Ander-
son originally bid the job, the excavation of
the retention ponds was not an integral
part of the project. After discussions with
Carey however, the excavation of the reten-
tion ponds, making available onsite fill, be-
came an important facet of the work. The
"revision" in the post-bid addendum obvi-
ously pertains to the added requirement of
excavating the retention basins.
Nowhere, however, does the contract re-
quire that only the material obtained from
the retention ponds should be placed on the
site. This point is emphasized by Carey's
letter of September 8, 1979, which he
termed a modification but which is more
appropriately characterized as an architect's
interpretation under Article 2.2.8 of the
General Conditions. In the letter, he care-
fully explained that the post-bid addendum
was not intended to preclude the use of
other fill.
The Court finds that the contract did not
limit the contractor to the use of onsite fill,
thereby making offsite fill an extra. The
provision for a unit price for offsite fill does
not change this conclusion. The contract
contains a stipulated price for offsite fill to
7. The failure to comply with the provision for
notice of claims for an increase in the contract
sum bars recovery of the extra compensation.
See Goodwin, Inc. v. City of Lafayette, 418 F.2d
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be used in the event that the owner, at his
own or another's recommendation, conclud-
ed that offsite fill was needed for some
purpose not contemplated in the original
specifications.
[12] Because on several occasions Chavis
requested and Golden on two occasions
(Change Order Nos. 2 and 3, though the
latter was reversed) authorized the pur-
chase of offsite fill, the question arises
whether by their course of conduct, the
parties modified the contract to make off-
site fill an extra on all occasions. In the
Court's opinion, the parties did not modify
the contract by their conduct. Golden au-
thorized the purchase of offsite fill when,
because of the moisture content of the on-
site fill, the site could not be proofrolled
without a bridge layer of offsite fill, a
condition surely not foreseen by either par-
ty. Chavis only requested such authoriza-
tion when the onsite material was saturated
to the point that it could not be proofrolled
or would entail delays if used. As discussed
above, he did not request change orders
with regard to much of the offsite fill al-
legedly utilized on the site.7
[13] Thus, the Court cannot conclude
that the parties treated offsite fill as an
extra to the contract entitling the plaintiff
to recover extra compensation. The Court
does find, however, that Golden's authoriza-
tion of an increase in the contract sum for
offsite fill used as a bridging lift to allevi-
ate unforeseen proofrolling problems estops
him from arguing that offsite fill was never
an extra. Therefore, when Whitaker Labo-
ratory personnel and Chavis recommended
in February of 1980, that a bridging lift of
offsite fill be placed on Unit D, at a cost of
$10,850.00, Golden should have authorized
the purchase of the fill. Golden might have
done so had he been presented with such a
request, but it appears that Carey did not
transmit the request to Golden. (See print-
ed message on P-42).
698 (5th Cir.1969); see also E.C. Ernst, Inc v.
General Motors Corp., 537 F.2d 105 (5th Cir.
1976).
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[14-17] As to whether the use of offsite
fill was an extra in unforeseen circumstanc-
es other than the inability to proofroll situa-
tion, "[li]t is an elementary principle of con-
tract law that in order to recover for 'ex-
tras', [the contractor] must show that they
are in fact extras." KC. Ernest, Inc. v.
Koppers Co., Inc., 476 F.Supp. 729, 754
(W.D.Pa.1979). Extra or additional work is
work not contemplated in the original speci-
fications. When the work performed is
covered under the lump sum contract, the
contractor cannot consider the cost of per-
formance as an extra. Baton Rouge Con-
tracting Co. v. West Hatchie Drainage
Dist., 804 F.Supp. 580, 585 (N.D.Miss.1969);
Continental Casualty Co. v. Wilson-Avery,
Inc., 115 Ga.App. 793, 156 S.E.2d 152 (1967).
In a fixed sum contract, a contractor is not
entitled to additional compensation simply
because unforeseen difficulties are encoun-
tered. United States v. Spearin, 248 U.S.
132, 39 S.Ct. 59, 63 L.Ed. 166 (1918); Jeffer-
son Construction Co. v. United States, 183
Ct.CI. 720, 392 F.2d 1006, 1007 (Ct.Cl.1968);
Baton Rouge, 304 F.Supp. at 585. How-
ever, if the services are not contemplated
by the original agreement and are neces-
sary to perform the work, the law will
imply a promise to pay for the extra serv-
ices. Puritan Mills, Inc. v. Pickering
Constr. Co., Inc., 152 Ga.App. 309, 262
S.E.2d 586 (1979).
[18,19] Under the agreement between
Anderson and Golden, Anderson was clearly
required to bring the site to the final grade
levels. Anderson teftified that he under-
stood that he had to fill the site no matter
how much fill was required. The contract
did not specify the amount of fill to be
placed on the site. The quality of the mate-
rial, though known to be wet and slow to
drain, was an unforeseen circumstance to
all the parties. This case falls within the
rule of Spearin. Puritan Mills is not con-
trolling here because the service-filling
the site--was clearly contemplated by the
contract. Anderson cannot recover the cost
of the offsite fill as an extra merely be-
cause unforeseen difficulties arose. There
was no supplemental agreement to pay.
Indeed, Golden repeatedly informed Ander-
son and Chavis that he would not pay foi
the offsite fill they chose to use because of
the poor quality of the onsite fill. Nor is
recovery in quantum meruit warranted be-
cause "the required performance [does not]
fall(s) outside the terms of the original obli-
gation." Brookhaven Landscape and Grad-
ing Co. v. J.F. Barton Contracting Co., 676
F.2d 516, 521 (11th Cir.1982).
[20] As with any other contract, Ander-
son assumed a risk when he bid that he
would not be able to perform the contract
for the amount of his bid. Where the cost
of compliance exceeds the contemplated
cost, the contractor has little choice but to
bear the burden of additional expenses.
See Pitman v. Dixie Ornamental Iron Co.,
122 Ga.App. 404, 177 S.E.2d 167 (1970); Tal-
erica v. Grove Park Plumbing Service, Inc.,
103 Ga.App. 591, 120 S.E.2d 36 (1961).
[21,22] b) To overcome the rule that
extra compensation is not recoverable when
unforseen difficulties are encountered dur-
ing the course of performing a fixed-sum
contract which is capable of performance,
courts have found that an implied warranty
by the owner that conditions are as describ-
ed in plans and specifications may be
breached by defective plans. Jefferson
Construction Co. v. United States, 183 Ct.CI.
720, 392 F.2d 1006, 1014 (Ct.Cl.1968). The
warranty is not vitiated by standard clauses
disclaiming responsibility for the accuracy
of data or requiring the contractor to verify
the specifications by inspecting the site.
Hollerbach v. United States, 233 U.S. 165,
34 S.Ct. 553, 58 L.Ed. 898 (1914). This is so
because contractors cannot be expected to
perform certain investigations such as soil
borings. In order to calculate a bid, bidders
must be able to rely on representations by
the owner as to subsoil conditions and other
nonobvious conditions. Robert S. McKee,
Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 414 F.Supp. 957, 959
(N.D.Ga.1976).
[23,24] The contract involved here spe-
cifically provided in several of the docu-
ments that the contractor was responsible
for investigating soil and subsoil conditions,
for visiting the site and familiarizing him-
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self with local conditions, and for correlat-
ing the drawings and specifications with
existing conditions. Ground elevations,
utilities, and soil conditions as shown on the
drawings were expressly not guaranteed to
be correct. The contract contained no
changed conditions clause, the purpose of
which is to relieve the bidder of the risk of
encountering adverse subsurface conditions.
Al Johnson Constr. Co. v. Missouri Pac. R
Co., 426 F.Supp. 639, 646-7 (E.D.Ark.1976).
The contract thus squarely placed the risk
of uncertainty as to site conditions on the
contractor. The owner did not impliedly
warrant the accuracy of his agents' investi-
gations. See Eastern Tunneling Corp. v.
Southgate Sanitation Dist., 487 F.Supp. 109,
112 (D.Colo.1979).
[25-27] Even where no implied warran-
ty exists, the owner may be liable because
of misrepresentations of material facts
about the site conditions. Thus, placing the
risk of uncertainty on the contractor does
not absolve the owner of the duty not to
materially misrepresent conditions. In or-
der to prevail on a claim of misrepresenta-
tion, the plaintiff must satisfy two require-
ments: that he was not reasonably able to
discover the true facts for himself and that
the misrepresentation was material.
McKee, 414 F.Supp. at 959-60. What con-
stitutes a reasonable ability to discover the
true facts depends on the time constraints
involved, the nature of the alleged misrep-
resentation, and whether the defendant ex-
pected that bidders would rely on the speci-
fications and plans provided. Al Johnson,
426 F.Supp. at 647; McKee, 414 F.Supp. at
960.
[28] I have already found that the omis-
sion of the ditches and the elevation differ-
ences on the Carey plan as compared with
the Gignilliat topo were, as a factual mat-
ter, immaterial, based on Helmly's testimo-
ny. At any rate, the drainage ditches were
alluded to in the specifications, and it is
apparent to the Court that had Chavis done
a more careful inspection of the site, the
ditches would have been revealed. Like-
wise, the plaintiff was put on inquiry notice
of the easements and utility lines they con-
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tained. Thus, the plans and specifications
were not defective in this regard.
[29, 30] As to the quantity of fill which
the Court has found that Chavis could not
have included in his estimate of the amount
of fill needed to raise the site to finished
grade levels because of a variance in the
existing ground elevations and those shown
on the Carey drawing, the question is
whether Anderson should have discovered
the discrepancy himself, taking into account
the time constraints, the nature of the de-
fect, and the owner's expectations. The
invitation to bid was issued on May 23,
1979. The bid opening was held on June 12,
1979. Anderson would have had to incur
expenses to survey the site himself, with no
assurance that his bid would be accepted.
A more careful inspection of the site would
not have revealed the discrepancy. Cf. In
re D. Federico Co., Inc., 16 B.R. 282, 287-8
(Bkrtcy.D.Mass.1981). The Court finds that
Anderson and Chavis justifiably relied on
the architect's plans in constructing the bid
and in estimating the quantity of fill need-
ed. As to Anderson's post-bid responsibili-
ty, the evidence demonstrated that he did
discover, perhaps serendipitously, the vari-
ance and that he then made a formal re-
quest for an increase in the contract sum,
based on the results of the independent
survey requested by the architect. In the
Court's opinion, Anderson acted as expedi-
tiously as could be expected under the cir-
cumstances.
[31] The second prong of the test re-
quires the plaintiff to establish the materi-
ality of the misrepresentations. "(Ilt will
not be sufficient for the plaintiff to show
that it was misled by the general conclu-
sions made by the (owner's) agents ... ;
the plaintiff must show that the underlying
factual data ... was inaccurate." McKee,
414 F.Supp. at 961. The plaintiff estab-
lished through Helmly's testimony that the
existing ground elevations differed from
those shown on the Carey drawing, there-
fore the Court finds that the plaintiff
carried its burden of showing that the un-
derlying factual data was inaccurate.
Thus, the plaintiff may recover the cost of
ANDERSON v. GOLDEN
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7,698 cubic yards of fill at $2.50 per cubic
yard. The Court also concludes that the
initial Helmly survey and calculations in
March, 1980, were required by the owner's
agent, the architect, and therefore this cost
should be borne by the owner.
[32-35] 2. The Court has previously
found that Anderson executed partial lien
waivers with each pay request. Lien waiv-
ers are valid and enforceable under Georgia
law. Ga.Code Ann. § 67-2001(2); O.C.G.A.
§ 44-14-361(b); R.S. Helms, Inc. v. GST
Development Co., 135 Ga.App. 845, 219
S.E.2d 458 (1975). Such waivers are en-
forceable even against the contractor's con-
tention that his intention was only to subor-
dinate his lien claim to that of the lender.
Id. Waivers of lien rights must be distin-
guished from contractor's affidavits which
in the usual course of business are sworn
statements by the contractor that he has
paid the subcontractors the reasonable val-
ue or agreed price of work done or material
furnished. Jackson's Atlanta Ready Mix
Concrete Co., Inc. v. Industrial Tractor
Parts Co., Inc., 139 Ga.App. 422, 228 S.E.2d
324 (1976). Only a sworn statement to such
effect taken upon final completion of the
work is a binding release of materialman's
lien rights. Bankston v. Smith, 134 Ga.App.
882, 216 S.E.2d 634 (1975); Massachusetts
Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Realty Trust Co., 142
Ga. 499 (1914). The sworn statement with
regard to the payment of the agreed price
or reasonable value thereof does not refer
to the contract price between the owner
and the contractor. Short & Paulk Supply
Co. v. Dykes, 120 Ga.App. 639, 171 S.E.2d
782 (1969). Hence, plaintiff's assertion that
only a sworn statement taken at the com-
pletion of the work is binding, is inapposite
in the case of lien waivers.
[36] The language of the lien waivers
and of the contractor's affidavit forms is
clear and unambiguous:
Acknowledgment of Payment and Waiver
of Right of Lien:
For valuable consideration in hand paid
to the undersigned, in the amount of
, receipt of which is hereby ac-
knowledged to his (its) complete satisfac-
tion, the undersigned does hereby waive,
release and relinquish any and all claims
or rights of lien which he (it) may have
upon the premises owned or leased by
Golden & Company in the City of Savan-
nah, State of Georgia for labor and mate-
rial furnished to date on said premises.
Contractor's Affidavit:
[Affiant] ... on oath, deposes and says
as follows ...
4. That the undersigned hereby waives
and releases his right and the right of the
above-referenced contractor to file a me-
chanic's or materialman's lien against
said property.
[37] The Court finds that the above-
quoted language constitutes a partial waiv-
er of lien rights. Therefore, Anderson, by
executing the waivers, waived any lien
rights with regard to the amount of the
contract sum already paid. No lien may be
asserted for an amount which would exceed
the agreed-upon contract price, even though
the cost of completion may exceed the con-
tract sum. Thompson v. Brannen Bldg.
Supply, 153 Ga.App. 4, 264 S.E.2d 498
(1980). In addition, the owner is entitled to
deduct the cost of completion from the bal-
ance due. Hausen v. James Development,
Inc, 143 Ga.App. 265, 238 S.E.2d 265 (1977).
[38,39] 3. The defendant asserts that
the filing of the mechanic's lien was wrong-
ful and that it is therefore entitled to recov-
er for slander of title in the amount of his
compensable damages and for punitive
damages. Georgia recognizes that the
wrongful filing of a mechanic's lien may
give rise to an action for slander of title.
Here, however, the defendant has not es-
tablished the elements necessary to state
such a cause of action. Section 105-1411 of
the Georgia Code Annotated, O.C.G.A.
§ 51-9-11 provides that an "owner of an
estate in lands may maintain an action for
libelous or slanderous words falsely and ma-
liciously impugning his title, if any damage
shall have accrued to him therefrom." The
owner must allege and prove the publica-
tion of slanderous words (here, the wrong-
ful filing of the lien), their falsity and mali-
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ciousness, and special damages. Copeland
v. Carpenter, 203 Ga. 18, 45 S.E.2d 197
(1947); Schoen v. Maryland Cas. Co., 147
Ga. 151, 153, 93 S.E. 82 (1917). Aside from
the absence of proof of malice, the defend-
ant failed to demonstrate that he sustained
special damage.
[40, 41] 4. There is no doubt that An-
derson failed to timely complete the con-
tract and failed to complete some portions
of the work at all. That time was of the
essence of the contract was made abundant-
ly clear. "Time is of the essence" clauses
are enforceable in Georgia Ga.Code Ann.
§ 20-704, O.C.G.A. § 13-2-2. However,
Georgia follows the English rule which al-
lows recovery in quantum meruit by a
plaintiff who is in substantial breach of the
contract, as long as the breach is not willful
or deliberate. Martin v. Rollins, 238 Ga.
119, 121, 231 S.E.2d 751 (1977). Except for
some minor items of the contract, Anderson
completed the rough-grading and storm
sewer system work. The defendant accept-
ed the benefit of this performance. There-
fore, the Court finds that the plaintiff is
entitled to recover the value of his labor
and services which the Court finds to be
equivalent to the unpaid contract sum, with
set-offs which will be discussed hereinafter.
The payment due shall include the full
amount of Change Order No. 3. In the
Court's opinion, it would be inequitable to
allow the defendant to reap the benefits of
Anderson's work without reimbursing him
for the cost of the performance where the
defendant authorized the work and then
withdrew permission despite notice of the
rain which made prompt performance im-
possible.
5. Ledbetter Construction Company and
Shuman Construction Company completed
certain items of the Anderson contract upon
Anderson's failure to do so because of the
termination of his contract. The defendant
is entitled to offset $7,680.58 for the sums
paid to these contractors against the plain-
tiff's recovery. Ayers v. Baker, 216 Ga.
132, 114 S.E.2d 847 (1960).
Hussey, Gay & Bell, Inc. submitted a bill
in the amount of $2,038.00 for services per-
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formed in connection with the discovery,
during the summer of 1980, of inaccuracies
in the grade stakes in the parking lot area.
A survey was conducted pursuant to the
request by the general contractor or its
project representative, after discrepancies
were noted in the grade stakes set by An-
derson's rough-graders. Anderson subse-
quently undertook to correct the grades.
The owner is entitled to a set-off for the
expenses incurred in discovering the dis-
crepancies. Id.
[42] Anderson also seeks to recover ad-
ditional costs incurred in correcting the in-
accurate grades. It is well-settled that a
contractor is not entitled to additional com-
pensation for work necessitated by his own
inadequate performance. 17A CJ.S.
§ 371(1). The plaintiff will not, therefore,
be allowed to recoup the costs of correcting
the grades. The claims of $7,264.26 which
Anderson paid to Shuman for fill and of
$13,650.00 for regrading are denied.
6. The remainder of both parties' al-
leged damages flow from the long delay in
completion, primarily in the form of addi-
tional expenditures. The defendant also
claims that he lost rental payments because
of the delay, though the proof on this point
was unconvincing since the outside dates
contained in the leases for the tenants' en-
try into the premises were all met. Where
each party proximately contributes to the
delay, "the law does not provide for the
recovery or apportionment of damages oc-
casioned thereby to either party." J.A.
Jones Construction Co. v. Greenbriar Shop-
ping Center, 332 F.Supp. 1336 (N.D.Ga.
1971), aff'd 461 F.2d 1269 (5th Cir.1972).
Anderson badly misjudged the job to the
extent that he based his deadlines for com-
pletion on ideal conditions and offsite fill
quality. Some delays resulted from Chavis'
failure to carefully examine the plans and
specifications. Golden aggravated the de-
lays caused by the poor weather and quality
of onsite material by failing to establish an
expeditious method for approving proce-
dures, settling disputes, and authorizing
changes in the work. "It is well established
that an owner has an obligation to facilitate
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the work of a contractor and to not do
anything that would obstruct or impede the
contractor's work." Niagara Mohawk Pow-
er v. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co., 470 F.Supp.
1308, 1322 (N.D.N.Y.1979). For these rea-
sons and others discussed fully elsewhere,
both party's claims for delay damages are
denied.
[43-45] 7. There is no basis for an
award of attorney's fees to Anderson. Ga.
Code Ann. § 20-1404; O.C.G.A. § 18--11l
provides that "[t]he expenses of litigation
are not generally allowed as a part of the
damages; but if the defendant has acted in
bad faith, or has been stubbornly litigious,
or has caused the plaintiff unnecessary
trouble and expense, the jury may allow
them." Where there is a bona fide contro-
versy or genuine dispute, an award of attor-
ney's fees is precluded. Eldon Industries,
Inc. v. Paradis and Co., 397 F.Supp. 535, 543
(N.D.Ga.1975). Moreover, Georgia law does
not allow attorney's fees under section 20-
1404 where "the amount recoverable is con-
siderably less than the amount sought,"
Broyles v. Johnson, 103 Ga.App. 102, 118
S.E.2d 734 (1961), because this indicates the
existence of a genuine dispute. Based upon
the foregoing findings and conclusions, it
should be apparent that the Court was
presented with a bona fide controversy.
Attorney's fees are therefore denied.
SPECIAL VERDICT AND ENTRY
OF JUDGMENT
The Court having heard the evidence in
the above-captioned case, now returns the
following special verdict on the claims and
counterclaims of the parties:
A. Amounts Due Plaintiff Anderson
1. Value of Performance
2. Change Order Requests for
off-site fill, including
Change Order No. 8
$ 61,974.45
1s,975.00
8. Reimbursement for extra
fill required by elevation
disparities on plans at
$2.50 per cubic yard 19,245.00
. Paid to Third Parties
[Helmly, Purcell survey and calculations
in Spring, 1980] ... To be submitted by counsel
A. Amounts Due Plaintiff Anderson
5. Interst
[Legal rate of interest,
7% per annum, to run from
date of demand, November 80, 1960]
TOTAL DUE PLANTIFF
B. Amount Due Defendant Golden
1. Shuman Construction Co. $ 6,448.25
2 Ledbetter Construction Co. 1,27.
s. Huasey, Gay & Bell fee 2a•8.00
4. Drainage pipes under anal s00.00
5. Interest [Legal rate of interest
7% per annum, to run from date
of trial]
TOTAL DUE DEFENDANT TO BE OFFSET
AGAINST TOTAL DUE PLAINTIFF
JUDGMENT
The foregoing special verdict having been
found, the Court will enter judgment there-
on fifteen (15) days from the date of the
filing of this Order. Counsel for the parties
shall submit those items indicated. Counsel
are directed to review the figures set forti
herein for correctness, to calculate interesi
in accordance with the foregoing instruc.
tions, and to furnish the Court with appro
priate sums for final judgment.
It appearing that a lien was timely filed
the final judgment may include the same
(KElJYUBRSYSTEM
Eugene HOLLINES, Petitioner,
v.
WJ. ESTELLE, et al, Respondents
Civ. A. No. W-81-CA-2L
United States District Court,
W.D. Texas,
Waco Division.
Feb. 4, 1983.
On Denial of Motion for New Trial
March 8, 1983.
On a petition for a writ of habeas cor
pus, the District Court, Nowlin, J., helt
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890 U.S. 129, 132, 88 S.Ct. 748, 750, 19
L.Ed.2d 956 (1968); United States v. Bags-
by, supra, 489 F.2d at 727; United States v.
Haili, 443 F.2d 1295, 1299 (9th Cir. 1971).
When, however, an accomplice of the de-
fendant is cross-examined about crimes
which he has admitted in proceedings con-
ducted after the offense for which the de-
fendant is being tried, and when the use of
such past offenses to show the potential
bias of the witness is apparent, then the
failure of the defense to identify the precise
theory of bias at the outset of cross-exami-
nation does not block it from bringing the
admission of the crimes before the trier of
fact. This is especially the case where, as
here, the defense counsel expressly noted
that he was attempting to test the witness's
credibility.
[7] There is a further, alternative
ground to support our ruling. The state
trial court sua sponte declared that it would
not, as the trier of fact, give any considera-
tion to the point that the second witness, in
cross-examination, testified that he had ad-
mitted commission of 48 burglaries in the
juvenile proceeding conducted after the ar-
son. The court based its ruling on the
Oregon statute which forbids the use of
juvenile records in any proceeding other
than juvenile court. Or.Rev.Stat. § 419.-
567(3). This sua sponte striking of the
cross-examination of a key prosecution wit-
ness constituted prejudicial error. The
need of the defendant to cross-examine a
principal government witness to show possi-
ble bias outweighed the need of the state to
maintain the confidentiality of its juvenile
records. Davis v. Alaska, supra, 415 U.S. at
820, 94 S.Ct. at 1112. The testimony was
relevant to show possible bias or self-inter-
est of the witness who testified against
Burr. The state did not object to the intro-
duction of the testimony. The state trial
court's sua sponte striking of testimony
elicited during cross-examination which
tended to show the bias or self-interest of
the witness denied the defendant his right
to confront that witness. We conclude that
[pJetitioner was thus denied the right of
effective cross-examination which
"'would be constitutional error of the
first magnitude and no amount of show-
ORTER, 2d SERIES
ing of want of prejudice would cure" it.'
Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 8 [86 S.Ct.
1245, 1246, 16 L.Ed.2d 314]." Smith v.
Illinois, 890 U.S. 129, 131 [88 S.Ct. 748,
750, 19 L.Ed.2d 956] (1968).
Davis v. Alaska, supra, 415 U.S. at 318, 94
S.Ct. at 1111.
For the foregoing reasons, the district
court's order is AFFIRMED.
WALLACE, Circuit Judge, concurring:
I concur in the result reached by the
majority. The cross-examination of the
second juvenile accomplice elicited the ad-
mitted commission of 48 burglaries without
objection. The relevance and materiality of
the evidence was obvious. I agree with the
majority that the sua sponte striking of this
evidence requires reversal. I therefore
would not reach the question whether
Burr's counsel preserved the error when he
failed to specify with clarity the basis of his
cross-examination of the first juvenile ac-
complice on similar facts. As the question
will not arise during retrial, there is no
reason for us to reach the issue.
KEY U UMBER SYSTEM
UMPQUA RIVER NAVIGATION
COMPANY, Appellant,
V.
CRESCENT CITY HARBOR
DISTRICT, Appellee.
UMPQUA RIVER NAVIGATION
COMPANY, Cross-Appellee,
V.
CRESCENT CITY HARBOR DISTRICT,
Cross-Appellant.
Nos. 77-4000, 77-4046.
United States Court of Appeals,
Ninth Circuit.
May 12, 1980.
General contractor brought action
against harbor district, seeking to recover
.1
II
I
ost overruns incurred by dredging subeon-
ractor, and harbor district sought indemni-
ication from engineering firm. The Unit-
dd States District Court for the Northern
District of California, Charles B. Renfrew,
c., entered judgment for harbor district and
engineering firm against general contractor
mnd for engineering firm on harbor dis-
;rict's indemnity action, and appeals were
taken. The Court of Appeals, Goodwin,
Circuit Judge, held that: (1) general con-
tractor did not have standing to assert
breach of warranty claim on subcontractor's
behalf; (2) general contractor had standing
to assert subcontractor's derivative claims
under general contract's changed conditions
clause; (3) district court did not clearly err
in concluding that subcontractor's reliance,
if any, on contractual data for dredging
nformation was unreasonable; (4) district
court did not err in concluding that engi-
neering firm was negligent neither in its
preparation and presentation of plans nor in
ts investigation and determination of sub-
contractor's changed conditions claims; and
5) engineering firm was not entitled to
recover its costs and fees from harbor dis-
trict under contract with harbor district.
Affirmed.
1. Contracts =185
General contractor did not have stand-
ng to assert breach of warranty claims
against harbor district on behalf of subcon-
tractor, where exculpatory language of sub-
:ontract thoroughly insulated general con-
tractor from any liability to subcontractor
for breach of warranty.
2. Contracts 0185
General contractor had standing to as-
sert subcontractor's derivative claims
Lgainst harbor district under general con-
tract's changed conditions clause; subcon-
tract incorporated general contract's
:hanged conditions provision, and subcon-
tract's exculpatory provisions did not limit
resort to that equitable remedy, and thus,
because general contractor was potentially
iable under equitable mechanism, it could
'aise parallel equitable claim against harbor
listrict.
618 FJd.-J6
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3. Contracts em185
Agreement between general contractor
and subcontractor pursuant to which gener-
al contractor agreed to bring action against
harbor district in return for exoneration of
any liability for cost overruns did not de-
prive general contractor of standing to raise
changed conditions claim on behalf of sub-
contractor, as agreement between general
contractor and subcontractor was contin-
gent rather than fixed in that general con-
tractor was exonerated only if it filed ac-
tion.
4. Contracts 0=232(1)
To prevail on changed conditions claim
for cost overruns incurred by subcontractor,
general contractor had to demonstrate that
contract plans indicated presence of certain
conditions, that this representation differed
materially from conditions actually encoun-
tered, and that subcontractor reasonably re-
lied on these indications to its detriment.
5. Contracts 0232(1)
Even if information in plans indicated
soil conditions in boat basin's access channel
and turning area which differed materially
from those actually encountered, district
court did not clearly err in concluding that
subcontractor's reliance, if any, on contrac-
tual data for dredging information was un-
reasonable, where special condition in-
formed bidders that backup reports for soil
data were available at harbor district's of-
fice but subcontractor made no effort to
obtain this information, where subcontrac-
tor's dredge captain had encountered rocks
on previous occasions while dredging areas
of the harbor near the project site, and
where subcontractor's own test results were
inconsistent with those shown "in contract
plans.
6. Public Contracts =16
Provisions in contract including
changed conditions clauses which shift some
of the burden of investigation to bidder are
narrowly construed and government dis-
claimers of responsibility for contractual in-
dications are disregarded.
UMPQUA RIVER NAV. CO. v. CRESCENT CITY HARBOR DIST.
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7. Contracts =93(1)
Bidders are required to inspect docu-
ments brought to their attention in the
bidding materials and to make general in-
spection of project site.
8. Federal Courts 4859
District court did not clearly err in
concluding that engineering firm was negli-
gent neither in its preparation and presen-
tation of plans nor in its investigation and
determination of dredging subcontractor's
changed conditions claims.
9. Contracts *187(1)
District court did not err in concluding
that engineering firm did not misrepresent
subsurface conditions at project site, that
firm was negligent neither in its prepara-
tion of plans and specifications nor in its
investigation of dredging subcontractor's
changed conditions claim, that firm did not
breach its contract with harbor district, and
that subcontractor therefore could not re-
cover, as a third-party beneficiary of engi-
neering firm's design contract with harbor
district, for engineering firm's preparation
of allegedly inaccurate plans and specifica-
tions.
10. Federal Civil Procedure =2731, 2737.6
Where general contractor brought suit
against harbor district and engineering
firm, harbor district filed third-party com-
plaint against engineering firm, seeking in-
demnification, and district court properly
entered judgment against general contrac-
tor and for engineering firm on indemnity
action, but where some, if not all, of engi-
neering firm's litigation costs were attribut-
able to its defense against general contrac-
tor's claims, it was virtually impossible to
apportion expenses between the two ac-
tions, and engineering firm was incidental
beneficiary of harbor district's expendi-
tures, engineering firm was not entitled to
recover its costs and attorney fees from
harbor district under contract with harbor
district.
David M. Buoncristiani, San Francisco,
Cal., Daniel J. Seifer, Kobin & Meyer, Port-
land, Or., argued for Umpqua River Navi-
gation; Thelen, Marrin, Johnson & Bridges,
San Francisco, Cal., Norman B. Kobin,
Portland, Or., on brief.
David M. Van Hoesen, Eric Danoff, Gra-
ham & James, San Francisco, Cal., argued
for Crescent City Harbor Dist.; Thomas M.
Dillon, Williams, Van Hoesen & Brigham,
San Francisco, Cal., on brief.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Califor-
nia.
Before CHOY and GOODWIN, Circuit
Judges, and SOLOMON,* District Judge.
GOODWIN, Circuit Judge:
Umpqua River Navigation Company
(Umpqua), a general contractor, appeals a
judgment denying recovery of cost overruns
incurred by its subcontractor, Western Pa-
cific Dredging Corporation (Western), while
dredging a boat basin for Crescent City
harbor district. Umpqua alleged, under
various contract and tort theories, that
specifications provided by the harbor dis-
trict and prepared by Swine Engineering,
Inc. inaccurately represented soil conditions
in the dredging area, that Umpqua and
Western relied on these specifications in
submitting contract bids, and that, during
the dredging, Western encountered condi-
tions materially differing from those shown
in the specifications, resulting in unforeseen
costs. The harbor district filed a third-par-
ty complaint against Swine, alleging that if
the specifications were negligently prepar-
ed, Swine must indemnify the harbor dis-
trict. The district court found that
Umpqua could not recover under any theo-
ry and entered judgment for the harbor
district and Swine against Umpqua, and for
Swine on the harbor district's indemnity
action. We affirm.
* The Honorable Gus J. Solomon, Senior United States District Judge for the District of Oregon,
sitting by designation.
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The series of events underlying this liti-
gation began in the early 1970's, when the
harbor district decided to investigate the
possibility of expanding its boat facilities.
In June 1971, as part of its preliminary
research, the harbor district commissioned
an independent firm, AAA Drilling, to drill
eight test holes on the beach near the site
of the proposed new boat basin to find
bedrock levels. AAA subsequently prepar-
ed drawings, showing the location of its
borings, the depth of bedrock, and the ma-
terials found between the surface and be-
drock. AAA made no underwater borings
in the proposed dredging channel.
Shortly after these drillings, still in June
1971, the harbor district informed Swine
that it had been chosen to design the new
boat basin. The harbor district turned the
AAA results over to Swine, and, after pro-
longed negotiations, the harbor district and
Swine signed a formal agreement in May
1972.
In August 1972, Swine arranged for Har-
id Mill 
a s ils en 
ineerin firm 
to
ng, IV's , o a g ,
make two more test borings. These holes
were drilled in the area where the breakwa-
ter surrounding the boat basin was to be
constructed, not in the dredging channel.
The results of the AAA and Harding,
Miller borings were included in sheet 002 of
the boat basin plans. Sheet 002 showed the
1. Special Conditions 3 and 4, and general con-
dition 21 read as follows:
"3. EXAMINATION OF SITE
"Each bidder shall thoroughly examine and
be familiar with the site of the proposed
project and submission of a Proposal shall
constitute an acknowledgment upon which
the Owner may rely that the bidder has thor-
oughly examined and is familiar with the site.
The failure or neglect of the bidder to fully
familiarize himself with the conditions at the
project site shall in no way relieve him from
or to the Contract. No claim for additional
compensation will be allowed which is based
upon lack of knowledge of the site.
"4. SOIL INFORMATION AND PILE
TESTS
"The drawings show soil test logs and pile
test logs reproduced from reports by the Dis-
trict's Soil Consultant. Copies of these re-
ports are on file at the offices of the Engi-
neers and at the District Office and may be
examined by prospective bidders. Each bid-
der shall make his own evaluation of thee y v .
presence of sandy clay, sand, clay, and grav-
el at the test hold sites. The term "gravel"
was not defined in the plans, and nothing in
the contract materials furnished to bidders
interpreted or elaborated on this soil infor-
mation.
In March 1973, the harbor district invited
sealed bids on the boat basin construction.
The bidding materials included plans, speci-
fications, and special and general condi-
tions. Particularly relevant to this case are
special conditions 3 ("Examination of Site")
and 4 ("Soil Information and Pile Tests'),
and general condition 21 ("Subsurface Con-
ditions Found Different").' Contractors
were given thirty days to submit their bids.
Before bidding, Umpqua examined the
results of the AAA borings reported on
sheet 002 and concluded that they were
unreliable except as showing the depth of
bedrock. Umpqua's project engineer found
the test results defective because the soil
logs were inconsistent and because the logs
did not include a legend defining various
soil terms. Umpqua did, in compliance with
special condition 4, request the reports un-
derlying the Harding, Miller soil logs.
Those borings, however, were taken at the
location of the proposed breakwater, and
not in the dredging channel.
information contained in the reports. Nei-
ther the Owner or the Engineers guarantee
that the soils borings, pile test logs or other
information shown are typical for the entire
site of the work."
"21. SUBSURFACE CONDITIONS FOUND
DIFFERENT
"Should the Contractor encounter subsurface
and/or latent conditions at the site materially
differing from those shown on the Plans or
indicated in the Specifications, he shall im-
mediately give notice to the Architect/Engi-
neer of such conditions before they are dis-
turbed. The Architect/Engineer will there-
upon promptly investigate the conditions,
and if he finds that they materially differ
from those shown on the Plans or indicated
in the Specifications, he will at once make
such changes in the Plan and/or Specifica-
tions as he may find necessary, and any in-
crease or decrease of costs resulting from
such changes to be adjusted in the manner
provided in Paragraph 17 of the General Con-
ditions."
r
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Western Pacific also conducted a pre-bid
investigation. Robert Kaltsukis, a Western
Pacific dredge captain, visited the project
site. Kaltsukis, who had encountered rocks
while dredging a nearby portion of Crescent
City harbor in the mid 1960's saw sub-
merged rocks in an area adjacent to the
dredging site. As part of his on-site inspec-
tion, Kaltsukis used a backhoe to dig test
holes near two of the AAA boring locations.
The results of these tests, which did not get
down to project level, were inconsistent
with the information shown on sheet 002,
yielding sand and pea gravel, rather than
only gravel, as indicated in the AAA re-
sults. Despite these discrepancies, Western
Pacific did not comply with special condi-
tion 4 and attempt to obtain the source data
for sheet 002.
Umpqua was awarded the boat basin con-
struction contract in May 1973, and shortly
thereafter selected Western Pacific as its
dredging subcontractor. Western's subcon-
tract bid, which Umpqua accepted, was
based on an estimated dredging output of
10,000 cubic yards per day, using hydraulic
dredging methods.
Western began dredging on May 29, 1973.
Almost immediately, the dredge "Polhe-
mus" encountered cobbles, boulders, and ce-
mented sand. The dredge sustained dam-
age requiring extensive repairs. These dif-
ficulties arose during the dredging of the
boat basin's access channel and turning
area, areas in which no soil borings were
taken. On July 26, Western notified
Umpqua that it had encountered conditions
materially different from those indicated in
the plans and that it was withdrawing the
"Polhemus" from the project. Umpqua for-
warded this notice to Swinc which, in turn,
informed the harbor district.
Western brought in a second, larger
dredge, the "Herb Anderson", which en-
countered difficulties similar to those en-
countered by "Polhemus." The parties of-
fer conflicting explanations of these prob-
lems. Umpqua contends that the damage
to the dredges was unprecedented, resulting
from extreme and unforeseeable concentra-
tions of cobbles and boulders. The harbor
district and Swine assert that Western's
dredging troubles were due to inefficient
crews and improper, maintenance of the
dredges.
Whatever the source of its dredging prob-
lems, Western Pacific, on August 25, again
notified Swine that it had encountered con-
ditions different from those shown in the
plans. Swine and the harbor district did
not formally investigate Western's claims
until November 28. On that day, with rep-
resentatives of Western, Umpqua, Swine,
and the harbor district present, Umpqua's
floating crane, "Mink", dug test holes at
three locations designated by Western. On
the basis of these borings, which yielded a
large quantity of sand and silt, some cob-
bles, and one boulder, Umpqua and Swine
engineers decided the basin was dredgable
and directed Western Pacific to continue.
Western Pacific completed dredging on
December 21. Over six months of intermit-
tent dredging, Western rarely met its
projected output of 10,000 cubic yards per
day. The material dredged during the en-
tire project was 80 percent sand, 15 percent
gravel less than three inches in diameter,
and 5 percent material exceeding three
inches in diameter. Neither Umpqua nor
Western Pacific obtained a change order, as
required by general condition 21, or sub-
mitted a bill for extra costs at any time
before June 6, 1974, when Umpqua reported
that the boat basin project was completed.
On June 11, 1974, Western informed
Umpqua that it had incurred additional
dredging expenses of $523,402. This claim
was ultimately forwarded to the harbor dis-
trict, which formally denied the claim on
July 30, 1974. The harbor district then paid
Umpqua 75 cents per cubic yard dredged,
and Umpqua paid Western. 65 cents per
cubic yard.
Umpqua and Western agreed, on January
28, 1975, that an action to recover the addi-
tional dredging expenses would be brought
in Umpqua's name, that Western would se-
lect counsel and bear all costs incurred in
prosecuting the action, that Western would
receive any recovery, and that Western ex-
onerated Umpqua of all liability for the
I
1.
I
I
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dredging overruns. Umpqua filed this ac-
tion the following day.
Umpqua argues in this appeal that it is
entitled to recover the dredging cost over-
runs on Western's behalf under any of four
theories. First, the harbor district is re-
quired to compensate for the overruns un-
der the contractual "changed conditions"
clause. Second, the harbor district is simi-
larly liable for breach of an implied warran-
ty of accuracy of the project's plans and
specifications. Third, even if Western's re-
liance on the project plans for dredging
information was unreasonable, Umpqua
may, under a comparative negligence for-
mulation, recover some portion of the re-
sultant overruns from the harbor district
and Swine because those parties were negli-
gent in their preparation and presentation
of the plans. Finally, Western, as a third-
party beneficiary of the harbor district-
Swinc contract may recover for damages
resulting from Swine's preparation of inac-
curate plans and specifications, breaching
that contract.
Before considering these contentions, we
must first address appellees' claim that un-
der the Severin doctrine Umpqua lacks
standing to raise the claims on Western's
behalf. Severin v. United States, 99 Ct.CI.
435 (1943), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 733, 64
S.Ct. 1045, 88 L.Ed. 1567 (1974). The Court
of Claims has summarized the Severin doc-
trine in the following manner:
"[A] prime contractor may sue the
Government for damages incurred by one
of its subcontractors through the fault of
the Government . . . only when the
2. Article 19 of the Umpqua-Western subcon-
tract, titled "Final Payment", reads in relevant
part as follows:
"In consideration of the promises, covenants
and agreements of the Subcontractor herein
contained and the full, faithful and prompt
performance of this agreement and the plans
and specifications constituting a part thereof,
the Contractor agrees to pay to Subcontrac-
tor and Subcontractor agrees to receive and
accept as full compensation for doing all
work and furnishing all materials, supplies,
etc., contemplated and embraced in this
agreement, also for all loss or damage arising
out of the nature of the work aforesaid, or
prime contractor has reimbursed its sub-
contractor for the latter's damages or
remains liable for such reimbursement in
the future. . . ." J. L. Simmons Co.
v. United States, 304 F.2d 886, 888, 158
Ct.Cl. 393 (1962).
The harbor district and Swine argue that
Umpqua does not have standing because it
is insulated from liability to Western for
the overruns in two ways. First, Article 19
of the Umpqua-Western subcontract pur-
ports to limit Umpqua's liability, even if
unexpected conditions were encountered, to
the first subcontract price.2 Second, even if
Article 19 did not limit Umpqua's liability
to the subcontract price, the January 28,
1975, agreement between Umpqua and
Western, in which Umpqua agreed to bring
this action in return for exoneration of any
liability for the overruns, absolved Umpqua
from liability to its subcontractor before the
action was filed.
We note initially that the Severin doc-
trine is based on concepts of sovereign im-
munity and privity and concerns only stand-
ing to raise contractual claims against gov-
ernmental entities. Nothing in Severin or
its progeny limits Umpqua's ability to as-
sert noncontractual claims against the har-
bor district or claims of any sort against
Swine, a private concern. Our inquiry,
then, is limited by determining Umpqua's
standing to raise claims against the harbor
district for breach of warranty or for ad-
justment under the changed conditions
clause.
[1] Under the Severin doctrine, Umpqua
does not have standing to assert a breach of
from the action of the elements, or from any
unforeseen difficulties or obstructions which
may arise or be encountered in the prosecu-
tion of the work until its acceptance by the
Principal, and for all risks of every descrip-
tion connected with the work; also for all
expenses incurred by or in consequence of
the suspension or discontinuance of the
work, and for well and faithfully completing
the work and the whole thereof, in the man-
ner and according to the terms of this agree-
ment and the requirements of the Contractor
and the instructions of the engineers in
charge of said work, payment at the unit
prices contained in Article XX hereof."
a-
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warranty claim on Western's behalf. The
exculpatory language of subcontract Article
19 thoroughly insulates Umpqua from any
liability to Western for breach of warranty.
Consequently, Umpqua may not raise a par-
allel claim against the District.
[2] Umpqua may, however, assert West-
ern's derivative claims under the general
contract's changed conditions clause. Ex-
culpatory language like that in Article 19
does not trigger the Severin bar when "sub-
contractor claims are asserted as an equita-
ble adjustment under the provisions of a
prime contract with the Government" and
when the prime contract's equitable adjust-
ment mechanism is incorporated by refer-
ence in the subcontract. Seger v. United
States, 469 F.2d 292, 800, 199 Ct.CI. 766
(1972). Here, the subcontract incorporated
the general contract's changed conditions
provision, and the subcontract's exculpatory
provisions did not limit resort to that equi-
table remedy. Because Umpqua is poten-
tially liable under the equitable mechanism,
it may, consistent with Severin, raise a par-
allel equitable claim against the harbor dis-
trict.
[3] Appellees' contention that the Janu-
ary 1975 agreement between Umpqua and
Western deprives Umpqua of standing to
raise the changed conditions claim lacks
merit. The agreement was contingent, not
fixed. Umpqua was exonerated only if it
filed the action. This is not the sort of
explicit and unequivocal exculpatory provi-
sion sufficient to invoke Severin. See J. L.
Simmons Co. v. United States, supra, 304
F.2d at 892.
[4] Umpqua's principal contention is
that the harbor district is liable for the
dredging overruns under the prime con-
tract's changed conditions provision, gener-
al condition 21,' because the materials en-
countered during dredging differed signifi-
cantly from those shown on sheet 002 of the
plans. To prevail on this claim, Umpqua
must demonstrate that: (1) the contract
plans indicated the presence of certain con-
ditions; (2) this representation differed ma-
)ORTER, 2d SERIES
terially from conditions actually encoun-
tered; and (3) Western reasonably relied on
these indications to its detriment. See Pos-
ter Construction C. A. & Williams Bros. Co.
v. United States, 485 F.2d 878, 193 Ct.CI.
587 (1970).
[5] We need not determine whether the
first two changed conditions criteria were
met because the third was not satisfied.
Even if the information on sheet 002 indi-
cated soil conditions in the boat basin's ac-
cess channel and turning area, where dredg-
ing was most difficult, which differed mate-
rially from those actually encountered, any
reliance on the contractual data for dredg-
ing information was unreasonable. The
district court entered a factual finding that
Western's reliance, if any, on sheet 002 was
unreasonable, and we are unpersuaded that
that finding was "clearly erroneous." Fed.
R.Civ.P. 52(a).
The rationale for the changed conditions
clause was summarized in Foster Construc-
tion C. A. & Williams Bros. Co. v. United
States, supra. Normally, bidders will en-
gage in extensive pre-bid inspections of
project sites to avoid losses from unknown
subsurface conditions. For the same rea-
sons, contractors will build a risk contingen-
cy element into bids, inflating contract
prices. If, however, the government con-
ducts a pre-bid inspection, assuming the
burden of investigation, and, through a
changed conditions clause, guarantees that
the contractor will be compensated for
overruns resulting from conditions not de-
tected by the government's logs, then the
inflationary cushion in bidding should be
reduced. Id. at 887.
[6] Consistent with these purposes, pro-
visions in contracts including changed con-
ditions clauses which shift some of the bur-
den of investigation to the bidder are nar-
rowly construed and government disclaim-
ers of responsibility for contractual indica-
tions are disregarded. See Foster Construc-
tion, 435 F.2d at 887-888; United Contrac-
tops v. United States, 368 F.2d 585, 177
Ct.Cl. 151 (1966). Accordingly, we give the
3. See note I supra.
exculpatory language in the harbor district-
Umpqua contract, special conditions 8 and
4 4, no effect.
[7] Still, bidders are required to inspect
documents brought to their attention in the
bidding materials and to make a general
inspection of the project site:
"[A] contractor cannot call himself misled
unless he has consulted the relevant
Government information to which he is
directed by the contract, specifications,
and invitations to bid. As we read them,
the decisions of the Supreme Court and
of this court do not permit the contractor
to rest content with the materials physi-
cally furnished to him; he must also refer
to other materials which are available
and about which he is told by the contract
documents." Flippin Materials Co. v.
United States, 312 F.2d 408, 414, 160
Ct.CI. 357 (1963) [footnote omitted].
Flippin was a misrepresentation case, but
the same duty to consult cross-referenced
material is implicit in the "reasonable re-
liance" language of cases involving changed
conditions claims. See, e. g., Foster Con-
struction, 435 F.2d at 888 ("The contractor
is unable to rely on contract indications of
the subsurface only where relatively simple
inquiries might have revealed contrary con-
ditions); United Contractors, 368 F.2d at
596 ("Business sense and human nature
would tell contractors not to shut their eyes
to relevant data of this type.").
Here, special condition 4 informed bidders
that the backup reports for the soil data
shown on sheet 002 were available at the
harbor district's office. Western Pacific
made no effort to obtain this information.
Robert Lofgren, Western's president, testi-
fied that if he had seen the backup data,
Western would have pursued a different
sort of on-site inspection than it did. West-
ern's failure to seek the backup information
undercuts its claim of reasonable reliance.
Several other factors further counter
Western's position. Western's dredge cap-
tain, Robert Kaltsukis, had encountered
rocks on previous occasions while dredging
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areas of the harbor near the project site.
Cf. Morrison-Knudson Co. v. United States,
845 F.2d 535, 640, 170 Ct.CI. 757 (1965)
(emphasizing contractor's prior experience
with similar conditions in the same locale).
Other Western personnel noticed partially
submerged boulders in an area adjacent to
the dredging channel during their on-site
inspection. The presence of boulders adja-
cent to the project area reasonably should
have alerted Western to the possibility of
boulders in the dredging channel.
Finally, although the changed conditions
clause rationale may have released Western
from any obligation to do investigatory dig-
ging at the project site, Western did in fact
dig some test holes. The fact that Western
made its own borings indicates that it was
not completely relying on the harbor dis-
trict's boring results. See Arundel Corp. v.
United States, 515 F.2d 1116, 1127 n.21, 207
Ct.CI. 84 (1965). The results of Western's
backhoe investigation were inconsistent
with those shown on sheet 002. This again
should have put Western on notice that
contractual indications were suspect.
Umpqua's changed conditions claim found-
ers on the rock of reasonable reliance.
Umpqua next contends that even if West-
ern Pacific was somehow negligent in rely-
ing on the information in sheet 002, the
harbor district and Swine were also negli-
gent in the manner in which they developed
and presented the results of the test hole
borings. Because California law applies in
this diversity context, the loss resulting
from the unforeseen conditions should be
apportioned among or between the parties
through the comparative negligence mecha-
nism.
[8] The district court entered factual
findings that Swine was negligent neither
in its preparation and presentation of the
plans nor in its investigation and determi-
nation of Western's changed conditions
claims. The trial judge made no findings
regarding the harbor district's possible neg-
ligence. However, because the only tort
liability Umpqua assigns to the harbor dis-
4. See note I supra.
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trict flows from the harbor district's en-
dorsement of Swine's actions, the trial
court's finding concerning Swine implicitly
deny negligence by the harbor district.
These findings must be sustained unless
clearly erroneous.
Umpqua argues that the district court's
findings concerning negligence are not enti-
tled to deference under Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a)
because they conflict with other factual
findings by the court. Specifically,
Umpqua contrasts the trial court's finding
that "Western Pacific's reliance, if any, on
the information contained on sheet 002 was
unreasonable . . . in light of the
manner in which the information was
presented" with the court's finding that
"Swine was not negligent in the prepara-
tion and furnishing of the Plans and Speci-
fications." If Swine was not negligent in
presenting the data on sheet 002, Umpqua
reasons, then reliance on that information
should have been reasonable.
We do not agree that these findings are
contradictory. The district court's finding
regarding unreasonable reliance reflects
testimony at trial that even a cursory read-
ing of the test hole data reproduced on
sheet 002 would reveal that those results
were reliable only as describing bedrock
depth and were not intended to show dredg-
ing conditions. While Swine's presentation
of the test hole data for the limited purpose
of indicating bedrock elevation was not
negligent, Umpqua's reliance on sheet 002
for dredging information was unreasonable.
We affirm the district court's findings
concerning Swine's negligence as not clearly
erroneous. Because neither Swine nor, by
implication, the harbor district, was negli-
gent, neither can be liable as comparatively
negligent.
(9] Umpqua contends, finally, that
Western, as a third-party beneficiary of
Swine's design contract with the harbor dis-
5. Article VI-7 of the "Agreement for Engineer.
ing Services" between the District and Swine
reads as follows:
"In any litigation or arbitration proceedings
between the parties concerning this Agree-
ment, the party, DISTRICT or ENGINEERS,
trict, may recover for Swine's preparation
of inaccurate plans and specifications, in
breach of that contract. Again, the district
court found that Swine did not misrepre-
sent subsurface conditions at the project
site and that it was negligent neither in its
preparation of the plans and specifications
nor in its investigation of Western's
changed conditions claim. We are not per-
suaded that these findings were in error.
Swine did not breach its contract with the
harbor district.
Because neither the harbor district nor
Swine is liable to Umpqua under any theo-
ry, we need not determine whether Swine
would have been obliged to indemnify the
harbor district had such liability existed.
Accordingly, the trial court's judgment for
Swine on the harbor district's indemnity
action was proper.
[10] Swine, as the "prevailing party" in
the indemnity action, claims that it is enti-
tled to recover its costs and attorney's fees
from the harbor district under Clause VI-7
of the District-Swine contract.5 We agree
that had Swine been named only in the
harbor district's indemnity action, it would
have been entitled to costs and fees. Here,
however, Swine was simultaneously defend-
ing two actions on identical grounds.
Some, if not all, of Swine's litigation costs
were attributable to its defense against
Umpqua's claims, and it is virtually impossi-
ble to apportion these expenses between the
two actions. Swine was also an incidental
beneficiary of the harbor district's expendi-
tures in defending against Umpqua's
claims. In these circumstances, we believe
that Swine and the harbor district should
bear their respective costs and fees.
The district court's judgments are af-
firmed.
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prevailing in such litigation or proceedings
shall be entitled, in addition to such other
relief as may be granted, to a reasonable sum
as and for Attorney's fees in such litigation
proceedings."
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